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Summary findings
Itoh and Urata examine how Japan's  public and private  Most loans for Japan's  SMEs were provided under
sectors support  small and  medium-size enrerprises  competitive market conditions bat  three sources of
(SMEs). They focus on technical, financial, and  directed credit - loans from specialized parastatals,
marketing assistance.  loans channeled  through  local governments,  and loan
Their findings are based on a survey of 107 firms: 40  guazantees - accountcd  for about  20 percent  of all SME
that produce  silverware, 33 engaged in synthetic textile  borrowing and 35 to 60 percent  of investment
weaving, and 34 that manufacture  auto parts. Each  borrowing.  Default rates averaged less than  one-half of
sector represents a distinctive form of industrial  one percent  of outstanding loans, and real interest rates
organization,  but they also share several characteristics:  were positive. The majority of firms surveyed used and
Each industry is concentrated  in a particular region, each  valued directed credits. The smallest firms in particular
involves-close subcontracting  relationships, and each has  valued them.
overcome difficulties and achieved a cerrain measurc of  Public institutions  complemented  the private
industrial success.  marketplace in all three areas. Public technical and
Technical support  for these SMEs came largely  marketing support helped create and maintain  private
through  private channels, including parent  firms,  networks. In finance, Japan successfully embedded
equipment  suppliers, and other firms in the same line of  directed credit in a well-functioning,  predominantly
business. Public institutions  played only a subordinate  private, competitive, and  prudential financial system.
role. Marketing support  also came largely from parent  Through  partnerships,  public support  continues to play
firms, trading companies,  and other private sources.  both a direct and an indirect role in supporLing the
Producers of intermediate  goods in particular - such as  development of SMEs in Japan.
auto parts and  synthetic textiles - relied heavily on
subcontractors.
This paper  - a product  of the Finance and Private Sector Development  Division, Policy Research Department-  is part
of a larger effort in the department  to examine the impact of proactive intervention  on SME performance.  Copies of the
paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H StreetNW,  Washington,  DC 20433.  Please contact Daniele Evans,
room N9-055,  extension 38526  (82 pages). December  1994.
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1. Introduction and Overview
This paper has two  main object;ves.  The first  is to  analyze how Japan's small and
medium enterprises ISMEs)  developed  over time, focusing on their acquisition of technological
capability, marketing capability, and financial resources. The second is to examine the public
sector's role in assisting SMEs to acquire  these technological and marketing capabilities and
financial resources. 1
We began by looking through published statistics  and studies to analyze past SME
performance and support policies. Then, between July and December 1992, we conducted
intensive interviews with SMEs in three target industries  based  on common survey questions.
At the national level, we interviewed officials from MITI, the Small and Medium Enterprise
Agency under MITI, and public financial institutions.  We also interviewed officials from local
govemment, chambers  of commerce, and industry associations. These  discussions  continued
throughout the period of our research, in order to deepen our understanding of the industries
involved and cross-check our findings.
The three industries  selected for this analysis  - the silverware industry, the synthetic
fiber-weaving industry,,  and the auto parts industry -- represent  three distinct prevalent types
of industrial organization  in Japan.  Despite  differences  in industrial  organization,  the industries
share several common characteristics.  First, each is geographically concentrated.  This
characteristic is important not only because  SMEs in the same industry are often focused on
a particular geographic area but also because  SME policies are often applied by region.  The
following industry-region  pairs were selected  for our analysis: silverware-Tsubame, synthetic
fiber-weaving-Fukui-Ishikawa, and auto parts-Ohta.  A second similarity is that each industry
has a close subcontracting relationship  with parent firms or trading houses.  As we shall see,
close relationships  of this kind are a pervasive  feature of Japanese SMEs. The third common
'A  large number of  studies on SMEs in Japan have bean published  in Japanese, but only a limited number have been
published  in English. See,  for example,  Kaneda  (1980), Yokokura (1988), and Berry  and Mazumdar  (1991).
1feature is that these industries  have all survived  difficult times and proven themselves
successful. A study  of such successful  cases  helps  to identify  important  factors leading  to
the development  of SMEs.
Small and medium  enterprises  (SMEs:  defined as enterprises  with less than 300
employees)  occupy  an  important  position  in the  Japanese  economy.  There  were  approximately
6.6 million SMEs in  1989, or  99.2 percent of the total  number  of non-primary  sector
establishments  in Japan. SMEs  employec  40 million  people,  accounting  for 80 percent  of non-
primary sector employment.  Small SMEs, (defined as enterprises  with  less than  20
employees),  play the dominant  role. Japan has some 5 million small SMEs  employing  15
million people,  accounting  for 76.8 and 31.3 percent  of the respective  SME  totals. 2 Many
SMEs  manufacture  parts and componients  used  in the production  of final products by large
firms. It is therefore  not possible  to fully understand  the economic  success  of the Japanee  e
economy  without recognizing  the role of SMEs.3
The Japanese  government's  recognition  of the importance  of SMEs  in the Japanese
economy,  as well as of their relatively  disadvantageous  position  vis-a-vis  large  firms, led  to
active SME  promotion  policies  in the post-World  War il period. In the early  post-World  War
'I period,  heavy  and  chemical  industries  were  heavily  promoted,  and  the basic  principle  behind
SME  policies  was  to protect  SMEs  from  the large  firms.  By  the mid-1  950s  this principle  had
changed  from protection  to promotion  and  modernization.  Behind  the change  in emphasis  was
the productivity disparity between  Japan's large firms and SMEs,  which the qovernment
wanted  to eradicate  in order  to achieve  further economic  expansion.
As the Japanese  economy  matured  after a period  of rapid economic  growth in the
1950s and 1960s, the objective  of SME  policies  changed  again. In the early 1970s,  the
emphasis  of SME  policies  shifted  from encouraging  growth-oriented,  larger-scale  production
2Between 1957 and 1989 the number  of SME  establishments  in the non-primary  sector increased  by 1.9 times, from 3.5
million  to  6.6 million.  The increase  was most notable in the 1  960s, when the Japanese  economy  experienced  rapid growth.
Over  the same period,  employment  at SMEs  increased  by 24  times. The  magnitude  of increase  in the number  of establishments
as  well as in employrmerit  was greater  for Large  finns, leading  to a declme  in the share  of SMEs  in the non-primnary  sector in both
indicators. The observed  decline in the share  of SMEs  in economic  setivities during the post World War II period reflects an
increase  in the scale of their operations.  (Prime  Minister's Office various issues.)
3  The changes  in the positien of SMEs  in manufacturing  are of particular interest, as the share  of SMEs  in manufacturing
employment  declined  from 73.5 percent  in 1957 to 69.0 perent  in 1969 before  increassing  to 73.5 percent in 1978 and further
to 74.4 percent in 1989. The decline  in the share  of SMEs  from 1957 to 1969 is due to a rapid expansion  in such scale-oriented
production as iron and steel.  In contrast, the increase  in share  that followed reflects a shift in manufacturing production from
scale-riented, material-based  manufacturing  to process-orianted,  component-based  manufacturing  such as electric machinery.
2supporting  to  high quality,  information-intensive production.  Moreover, since the  1970s,
policies have encouraged  SMEs to shift from declining to growing sectors, and to cope with
rapidly changing economic developments such as yen appreciation, two  oil crises,  labor
shortages, and environmental problems.
SME policies in Japan are basically  formulated at the central government  level, at MITI
and its subordinate  Small and Medium Enterprise  Agency. These  policies are  then implemented
mainly by local govemments, public institutions, and semi-publi! institutions (Table l-l).  Most
institutions  have national-prefectural linkages. The central body for the formulation of SME
policies  is the  Chusho Kigyo Seisaku Shingikai (SME Policy Council],  which  consists of
representatives from  business, academia, labor unions, journalism,  and the  Housewives
Federation, among others.
Instruments  applied to  carry out  SME policies include financial, tax-subsidy,  and
regulatory measures. Financial  measures  will be discussed  in more detail in Section VI, so we
will describe only tax subsidy and regulatory measures  here.
SMEs may  take  advantage of  preferential  corporate tax  treatment  and  special
depreciation  allowances.  Subsidies are  provided to  activities  such  as  research  and
development, and managerial  training.  There are also various-laws intended to protect SMEs.
For example, the Law on the Prevention of Delay in Payment  of Subcontracting Charges  and
Related  Matters (Shitauke  Daikin Shiharai  Chien-to  Boshi Ho) was enacted in 1957 to protect
subcontracting SMEs  from such unwarra..4ed  business  practices as delayed payment by parent
firms.4
Even at its peak (in 1970), just over half of one percent (0.61 percent) of the national
budget general  account was allocated  to SME  measures. The SME allocation was significantly
higher in the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program  (FILP),  in which SMEs consistently received
more than a 10 percent share, with a high of close to 20 percent in 1980.  In 1980, Y4,500
billion was allocated  to SMEs  through the FIP, compared  with Y1  95 billion through the general
budget.
*In fiscal 1991, the Fair  Trade  Comnission investigated  71,603 cass  and fund  1.548 violaions of toe law.  Of those oases
1,503  have been processed. In 1.492 cases, warnings were given and no action has yet been taken on the rermaining  101
cases. [Fair Trade Commission  (1992)11.  Industrial Organization and the Role of SMEs  in JaDan
Industry structure shapes what kind of support SMEs receive from other firms.  SME
marketing activities are supported  by parent firms and trading houses with which SMEs often
have close transactional relationships. SMEs also receive support for acquiring technological
capability  from  competing firms  in  the  same local  production  networks,  from  parent
companies, and from firms supplying equipments and materials.
This  section begins with  an overview  of the  determinants  -of  inter-firm  relations,
followed  by a detailed look at the patterns of such relations in the three chosen industries.
The final section summarizes  some distinct features of inter-firm relations and their implication
for SME support policies.
11-1.  Overview 
When one looks at the whole production process of a commodity, from the upstream
level  of  raw  materials to  downstream distribution,  one generally observes a number of
processes involved in producing that  particular good.  Take, for  example, a synthetic fiber
product.  In this  industry, the requisite. processes include the  production of  materials by
chemical companies, twisting  and sizing, weaving, finishing, and apparel making.  Products
like automobiles  and home electronic appliances  consist of many  parts, (e.g. more  than 30,000
parts for automobiles),  and each part requires a different production process.  Even products
like  silverware  and housewares, which  look quite simple in their  final forrms, actually go
through many production processes.
Inter-firim relations between sellers and buyers of intermediate goods are often quite
complicated.  Information is exchanged  between the firms involved in the transactions, and
cooperative  behavior  becomes necessary to  establish  efficient  transactional  relations.
Asymmetric  information and conflicts of  incentives between firms can make it  difficult  to
establish efficient transactional relations.  These problems  can be solved neither by vertical
integration, in which these problems are solved as internal allocation problems inside a firm,
nor by complicated inter-firm contracting mechanisms.
In Japan, the problems seem to  be resolved by interfirm contracting rather than by
vertical irntegration,  at least in comparison to other industrialized nations such as the United
-4States.  This reliance on non-integration  solutions creates considerable  opportunities for SMEs
to play important roles in the social division of labor.  While we do not have space here to
discuss fully why many Japanese  industries  choose non-integration  solutions, some of the key
reasons include:
*  Homogeneity  of population: Since the Japanese economy consists of a homogeneous
population with the same historical and cultural background, it is relatively easy for
firms to engage in complicated transactional relations.  As explained in the literature
on  game  theory  and  information economics,  in  repeated and  multiple  inter-firm
relations, firms can form cooperative  transactional  relations based  on such mechanisms
as reputation, hostage, and punishment.
*  High economic growth:  Many of the so called Japanese-style transactional relations
(such as the  subcontracting system, main bank system, and lifetime  employment
system), emerged  and expanded  during the country's high growth era, from the 1  950s
through  the  early  1970s.  When an  economy  is  growing  rapidly,  cooperative
transactional relations form more easily. 5
*  Geographical  concentration:  The formation of local production networks -- that  is, the
concentration of many SMEs  in narrow regions with highly interdependent  interactions
among SMEs, parent firms, and trading houses -- is the most important aspect of the
pattern of SME industrial organization in Japan.  Very high population density makes
it easy for firms to find business  partners with which they have repeated  transactional
relations; public institutions also played a key role in enhancing the function  of local
production networks.
9  Legal  structure:  It is often useful for larger firms to delegate various minor processes
of production to smaller firms through subcontracting transactions.  This separation
allows larger firms to apply different wage conditions for main corporate entities and
for  subcontracting firms.  In this way, larger firms can also enjoy the advantages of
various SME support policies, including tax  preferences applied to  subcontracting
relations.
11-2.  Automobile Industry: An Examole  of Subcontracting
The  automobile industry provides a classic example of the  role of  subcontracting.
According to one study, 55.9 percent of the SMEs in Japan were involved in subcontracting
relations in 1987.6  As shown in Table 11-1,  the ratio of internal to total production of large
50n this point see Klein, Crawford and Alchian [19781  and Itoh and Matsui [19871.
F  These numbers change  considerably  depending  on the definition of subcontracting  relations.  The definition used in this
figure is not clearly stated.auto assembling  firms tends to be usually low In Japan.'  The internal production rate of the
Japanese auto producers is around 30  percent, whereas the  figures are higher for  U.S.
producer General Motors (GM).  The production structure of the Japanese motor vehicle
industry  is sometimes called a "pyramid" or "multi-tier structure."  An assembler  has direct
transactional relations only with first tier subcontractors (suppliers);  first tier subcontractors
with second  tier subcbntractors; second  tier subcontractors  with third tier subcontractors, and
so on in a pyramid-like structure.  A MITI study of the subcontracting relations of a Japanese
automobile producer illustrates the resulting pattern (see Table 11.2).
The  automobile  industry  in  Ohta is  structured in  pyramid-style, with  Fuji Heavy
Industries on top as an assembler. Although there is no one-to-one correspondence between
the size of a firm  and the type of a subcontractor, higher-tier subcontractors are generally
larger than lower-tier subcontractors.  A survey of subcontractors for  Fuji Heavy Industries
conducted by Ohta city found that the average  number of employees  for the first-tier, second-
tier, and third-tier subcontractors  are, respectively,  258 (range: 35 to 1850), 24 (5 to 78), and
6 (11  to 30).8
In 1989 there were 73 establishments in Ohta's transport machinery  sector. 9 (Table II-
3).  Among them are two assemblers,  Fuji Heavy Industries and Nissan  Diesel. Assuming 100
employees as a cut-off point for first- and second-tier subcontractors, 11 establishments, or
around 15 percent of  the total,  are first-tier  subcontractors.  This makes the  number of
second- and third-tier subcontractors around  60, or 82 percent of the total. 10 Among the 60
second-tier and third-tier subcontractors, it  may be plausible to  assume that  10 to  20 are
second-tier  subcontractors and 40 to 50 are  third-tier subcontractors, assuming  30 employees
as a cut-off  point.  Despite the large number of second and third-tier subcontractors, they
account for only 5 percent of total value added  for the industry.
7 y the ratio of intemal production we mean  the share  of value added  to which assembling  firms contribute, compared  to
the total value added  for the automobile industry.
' Ohta city office, intemral  document.
Lack  of detailed statistics precludes  one from isolating  the automobile  and automobile  parts industry from the rest of the
transport machinery  sector.
1  The cut-off  point of 100 employees  for the first-tier and second-tier  subcontractors and 30 employees  for the second-tier
and third-tier subcontractors  is based  on a survey  conducted  by  the Ohta city office of subcontractors  for Fuji Heavy Industries.
6Both Fuji Heavy Industries and Nissan Diesel have their assembly plants in Ohta.  In
Gumma prefecture, where Ohta is located, Daihatsu and Hina also have assembly plants.
Nissan, Honda, and Isuzu operate  assembly  plants in neighboring  prefectures.  These near-by
assembly  plants offer abundant business  opportunities  for the auto parts producers in Ohta,"
-ilthough Fuji heavy industries  dominates. (A sample  survey conducted by the Ohta city office
in  1992  revealed that  50 percent of  36 subcontracting parts suppliers listed Fuji Heavy
Industries as their major sales partner).
Despite the dependence  of local Ohta auto parts suppliers  on Fuji Heavy Industries,  they
also have extensive business relationships with  assemblers outside of  Gumma.  Through
diversification,  parts  suppliers attempt  to  minimize the  costs  of  business fluctuations
associated  with a particular  assembler,  while assemblers  seek  to procure parts from the most
efficient  suppliers.  Overall the transactional relationship between subcontractors and their
parents in transport machinery production is not as rigid as the relationships observed in the
electronics industry, which also follows a pyramid-style  subcontracting  pattern.' 2 The average
number of parents per subcontractor has risen from 4.8 in 1990 to 5.3 in 1992. Simiiarly, over
the same period, the share of subcontractors whose sales-dependence  on.their primary parent
firm  exceeded 80 percent, dropped from 36 percent of subcontractors to  30 percent.'3 In
particular,  dependence on Fuji Heavy Industries is dropping rapidly, as the share of  Ohta
subcontractors that transact with  Fuji Heavy Industries -declined  from 64.4 percent in 1990
to 49.5 percent  in 1992.14
The degree of dependence  on single parent firm differs between the first- and second-
tier subcontractors.  First-tier subcontractors,  generally  with higher technological capabilities,
produce high quality parts that could be sold on their own.  Thus, a survey of subcontractors
'The size ot their potential market may be indicated by the fact that the number  of workers at thase assembling  plants in
Gumma and its  three neighboring prefectures amounted to  over 30,000  in 1987,  of approximately 20 percent of  overall
employment at assembly plants in Japan.
"The following statistics  attest to this observation. The  average  number  of parents  per subcontractor  for transport machinery
Is higher at  5.3 than that for electric machinery at 4.4, implying that subcontractors in transport machinery  rely less en one
particular parent  (Ohta  City Office [1992]).  This point may also  be observad  in the degree  of dependence  of subcontractors  on
parma  firms for their sales  in these two sectors. In transport  machinery,  those subcontractors  whose dependence  on their main
parent firm  (ie the  firm taking in the  largest sales) exceeds 80  percent. account for  30 parcent of  the total,  while the
corresponding  ratio in electric machinery  is significantly higher  at 50 percent.
13  Ohta  City Office [1990 and 1992].
4  Ohta  City office. Intemal  document.associated with  Fuji Heavy Industries (conducted by the Ohta city  office) found the sales
dependence of  first-tier  subcontractors  on  parent  firms  to  be  43  percent,  while  the
corresponding number for  second-tier subcontractors was  a much  higher 75  percent. 15
Although the statistics  are not available,  this dependency appears  to be even greater degree
for the third-tier suppliers.
11-3.  Silverware in Tsubame: Organization of a Traditional Local Production Network
Many of Japan's SMEs  have origins in Japan's traditional craft activities.  Often these
craft-based industries were concentrated in a particular geographic locality,  where various
factors  such  as  natural  environment  and  merchant  activity  contributed  to  the  area's
development.  Many of Japan's local production areas can be traced back to the Edo period
(1603-1867)  when handicrafts and local produce from around the country were brought to
central economic areas  such as Tokyo and Osaka  for sale. Tsubame city can be classified as
such a case.  Located nearby a copper mine, Tsubame became a center of  nail-making, a
traditional handicraft industry in the feudal period.  In a subsequent section, we will examine
how  Tsubame's  SMEs  evolved  from  traditional  handicraft  producers to  suppliers  of
contemporary silverware and housewares. The present section details the inter-firm relations
within which Tsubame SMEs currently are embedded.
Tsubame city  is the center of silverware production not only in Japan but also in the
world.'6 The basic silverware production process has remained the same since the start of
mass production  in  the  early  1900s.  A  typical  production  process for  silverware  and
housewares, shown in Figure 11-1  . requires a number of subprocesses."  Only a few firms
undertake the entire production process, while most focus on just  one or several of these
Ohta  City  Office,  Internal  document.
1 According to estimates by the Japan Metal Flatware  Industry Association,  world silverware production amounted to 200
million dozens  in 1985, of which 59 million dozens,  or approximately  30 percent. were produced  in Japan.
1For forks and spoons, a metal sheet is first cut according to the required  shape  (shearing). Then the part other than the
handle  is thinned with the use of a rolling  machine  (rolling). After the rolling  process,  the handle is cut exactly according  to the
shape that one sees in the final product (punching). Up to this point, the material is stifl flat.  The material is next given its
three-dimensional shape by the press machine (pressing). For  knives, the edge-making  process is required as well.  Finally.
polishing  is carried  out.  Each  ot these processes  requires  a number  of subprocesses.  For  example,  there maybe up to four steps
in polishing: rough polish (machine-operated),  rough electric polish, finishing electric polish, and finishing poish (manual).
'The production process  of housewares  is basically the same as that for silverware.  One  major difference, however, is
welding, whch  often takes place  in housewares  production but not silverware  production.
8processes, with the production system organized  as a pyramid-style subcontracting system.
This  pyramid style of production, which relies heavily on subcontractors, is well-suited to
Japanese-style  silverware production, in which a variety of silverware is produced in limited
quantities.
Parent firms, which  receive orders for  final products from trading houses or which
engage  in the production of final products at their own risk, consign several processes to the
first-tier  subcontractors,  which  in  turn  consign  some  processes  to  the  second-tier
subcontractors. First-tier subcontractors are generally  engaged  in such processes  as shearing,
rolling and other activities except for polishing. Second-tier subcontractors mainly specialize
in polishing. The relationship  among  the parent firms, first-tier subcontractors, and second-tier
subcontractors is quite flexible, since subcontracting arrangements are not formulated on an
exclusive one-to-one basis.
The silverware and housewares  industries  had 148 and 127 parent firms, respectively,
in 1991, according to statistics  reported by the city office  (Table 114). There were 182 and
265  first-tier  subcontractors,  respectively,  plus  1014  second-tier subcontractors,  who
specialize in polishing for  both silverware and housewares.  Parent firms often  undertake
subcontracting business  for other paient or trading firms.  Parerrt  firms ral-,ge  in size from small
firms with only one employee to medium-sized  firms with more  than one hundred employees,
while first and second-tier subcontractors on average  employ less than ten people. 19
Parent firms purchase inputs (such as stainless steel from metal producers) and inspect
finished products.  Since the quality of silverware  depends largely on the quality of materials,
silverware producers, especially the large ones, actively engage in the development of new
materials. Smaller  silverware manufacturers  generally  purchase  materials  from trading houses.
"'The  following numbers indicate the importance  of subcontracting in the silverware industry.  In 1990 as many as 41.5
percent of the firrns in the industry consigned work to other  firms; for medium-sized  firms with 20 or more employees,  96.2
percent had such arrangements  ISman  and Medium Enterprise  Agency [19901. pp. 58-59).  The share of all firms engaged  in
subcontracting was 68.9  percent, while the corresponding  share  for firms with less than 20 employees was higher at 74.3
percent.
911-4.  Fukui-lshikawa:  Complex Vertical Relations  in a Synthietic  Fiber Textiles Local Production
Network
As with other textile materials industries, the synthetic fiber industry is made up of
many tasks, from the upstream production of yarn by large  chemical firms to the downstream
production of apparel. Simplifying, the production process comprises five steps - (1) material
production by chemical firms  (through which yarn is produced), (21  yarn processing such as
twisting  and sizing, (3) weaving, (4) dyeing and finishing, and (5) apparel making.
Production steps (2), (3), and (4) take place in Fukui-lshikawa. Table 11-5  shows the
size distribution of weaving firms in terms of the number of looms in the two prefectures.  A
large number of weaving houses have 50 looms or less.  These are very small-scale firms,
mostly family-run, with less than 10 workers.  However, even the larger firns  with more than
100 looms are classified as SMEs, since they employ less than 300 workers.
Figure 11-2  illustrates the transactional relationships within  the synthetic fiber textile
industry.  There are several important players:  chemical companies producing yarn, large
trading houses, local wholesalers, and weaving houses.  The position of weaving houses in
Japan's synthetic fiber textile industry is quite different from that  of weaving houses in other
textile industries in Japan or from the weaving sector for  synthetic fiber industries in other
countries.  Much of the weaving process  takes place Linder  weaving service fee contracts with
chemical companies, trading houses, or local wholesalers.
A  service fee contract  operates as follows:  Either chemical companies or trading
houses supply yarn to weaving  houses, who  return the woven textiles to  them after  the
weaving and dyeing is finished.  Weaving houses are paid service fees based on the amount
of  woven textiles they produce.  Sales risk is covered by either the trading houses or the
chemical industry.  This  contractual form  was common historically  in the  traditional  silk
weaving  industry,  (out of  which  Fukui-lshikawa's synthetic  fiber industry  evolved).  T  he
practice  became increasingly dominant after World War 11. Thus in 1955  54%  of  Fukui-
lshikawa's textile  production was by fee contract.  By 1989,  this share had risen to  84%
suggesting that  weaving  houses in  Fukui-lshikawa have increased their  dependence on
10chemical companies and trading houses  for risk-taking, technical support, and sales of their
products. 20
It is necessary  to distinguish  between cases in which weaving houses  transact directly
with chemical  companies  and cases  in which weaving houses  transact with trading houses or
wholesalers."  When weaving houses  transact directly with chemical  companies,  the process
is called "maker chop" in Japanese,  which means the products are under the control of the
chemical  companies. When weaving houses  transact with trading houses  or local wholesalers,
the process is called "unbra," meaning non-brand  products.'
"Maker chop" products are given the brand names of  the  large national chemical
companies. 3 These  firms are heavily involved in the marketing  of their products, both textiles
and final goods.  Only weaving houses  with a reputation for sophisticated weaving skills are
invited to be members  of production networks under chemical companies. The weaving fees
under "maker chop" contracts are generally h.gher than those under "unbra"  contracts.
Chemical companies have been nurturing keiretsu weaving houses and have introduced a
series of new materials to the market in an attempt to improve competitiveness.
The textiles produced  under "unbra" contracts are not national brands.  Since trading
houses  and wholesalers  purchase  yam from chemical  companies,  the material they use is not
the most advanced. The weaving houses in this production network are relatively small and
have less technological skill in dealing  with new materials  than weaving houses  under "maker
chop" contracts.
20  lntemal  documents,  Fukul  and Ishikawa  -.  All 33 frms we interviewed  made  this kind of contract either  with chemical
companies  or with trading houses.  In fact, 66% of  the firms we  interviewed  answered that  1  00% of their products were
produced  under  fee contracts. For  the remainder,  10 to 30% of their pr". ucts are sold to third parties (through  trading houses)
with the risk taken by weaving  houses. This is quite  different from, say, the wool product industry, where weaving houses  are
more  independent.
2 'The  term 'trading houses' here  means  large  trading  companies  (sogo  shosha)  such as C.ltoh and  Marubeni, while the term
'wholesalers"  means local  trading companies. It is not necessary  to distinguish  between  the two for this discussion.
22There  are  some differences  between Fukui  and  Ishikawa. In Ishikawa  them are several large local wholesalers,  so "unbra"
is more  common  than in Fuktui.  Since  local  wholesalers rere  very influential  in Ishikawa,  they orgar'ze the local weaving houses
under  their control. Thus national  trading  houses  and chemical  companies  have  difficulty gaining direct access  to these weaving
houses.  The local wholesalers  purchase  yam from several chemical  companies  so that they do not depend heavily on one
paridcular  company. National  trading houses  such  as C.ltoh and Marubeni  are more  influential  in dt  Fkui  area,  where they have
established  their own production networks.  Large  chemical  companies  have  also established  their own production  network in
Fukui by inviting weaving houses  with high technical skills  to  be members  of their production networks.
z'The leading  chemical  companies  indude Toray,  Teijin  and Asahikassi,  an  of whch are clssified  as largescale corporations.
1 1The distribution of weaving houses between the two types of contracts reflects the
wide  variety  of  products produced in this  area.  Even the  firms with  high technical skills
involved in "maker chop" transactions also get involved in transactions with trading houses
or local wholesalers. 24 For firms mainly involved in "maker chop" contracts, "unbra'  contracts
are  a way to stabilize production, since orders from chemical companies  fluctuate considerably
depending on market conditions.
Most firms  have business relations with  more than two  trading houses.  There is a
continuous flow  of inquiries from trading houses to  weaving houses about the possibility of
weaving various kinds of textiles.  For their part, when weaving houses have new product
ideas, they go to trading houses to find out about the potential for selling these products.
11-5.  The Importance of Industrial Organization
As the three cases have illustrated, the Japanese economy incorporates SMEs in a
number of noteworthy ways.  These  include: (1) widespread  subcontracting in many industries
and regions, (2) the functioning of local production networks, called 'sanchi"  in Japanese, (3)
the complicated division of labor among  many firms in the vertical flow of goods encompassing
various  industries, and (4) the  intricate and complicated transactional relations observed
between firms.
Most SMEs depend upon the help of  local production networks  and subcontracting
relations for  survival.  They sell their products mainly to  parent companies or to  trading
houses, not directly to final consumers. They receive a continuous flow of information from
parent companies,  trading houses, and rival producers. Trading houses and parent companies
even provide SMEs with financial support in forms such as commercial credits.
Under these circumstances, public SME support policies can be effective  only when
they  are implemented through local production networks. Understanding their role can be
evaluated only in relation to the industrial organization  surrounding SMEs. Indeed, one of the
most important contributions of public SME support policies has been  to enhance the function
of  local production networks.  Beneficiaries  of these support policies are thus,  not only the
SMEs  that require local production networks and subcontracting relations to survive, but also
241n  our  sample. 27 out of 33 firms  are involved in both types of contrmcs.
12the larger  firms whose competitiveness depends  on the efficiency of subcontracting SMEs and
on active interactions with the local production network.
111.  Support Systems and Characteristics of SamDle  Firms
111-1.  SME SuDpport  Systems in Tsubame. Fukui. and Ohta
As discussed further in sc;tions  IV-VI, three types of  institutions  generally provide
support  to  SMEs, regarriless of  the  locality  (See Table 1-1).  First are those institutions
providing functional suppzrt in specialized  fields regardless  of the industry in question, such
as public financial institutions and technical centers.  These institutions are usually operated
by  either  national or  local governments.  Sector-specific organizations, such as industry
associations, are a second  type of supporting institution.  These are generally private or semi-
private  organizations, although they  often receive some form  of  public support, including
preferential loans and tax rates. Finally, various local govemments and chambers  of commerce
provide general support to all kinds of SMEs regardless of their business activity.  These city
and prefectural governments and local chambers of commerce are also generally engaged in
coordinating SME policies.
Before we begin our analysis of the operation of technical, marketing, and financial
support systems,  this chapter will  review some background feature's  of the  institutional
environment specific to Tsubame, Fukui and Ohta, followed by an introduction to the firms
surveyed in each locality.
Tsubame:  Table 111-1  shows important SME  public support institutions for silverware
producers in Tsubame. Support provided by non-sector specific institutions is often focused
on the silverware industry since it has a significant position in Tsubame's economy.  A case
in point is the Tsubame Wholesalers Cooperative Association.  Although set up to promote
wholesalers' dealings with Tsubame products in general, this association's major activity  is
distributing silverware.
Support institutions in Tsubame appear  to be quite active compared  to  other regions,
with the city office and the chamber  of commerce  playing a central role. The city has a strong
information  exchange network  among various  institutions,  including the  city  office,  the
chamber  of  commerce, and  industry  associations.  These  institutions  actively  collect
13information about the silverware industry and its needs by hosting meetings with producers.
Through this network, the city has developed  an effective system making its needs known to
the  central government.  -Indeed, Tsubame has long been a recipient  of  special central
government assistance for local production networks (Table 111-2).  Strong ties between the
industry  and the central government date back to the 1  950s, when the silverware industry
restrained exports at MITI's request.
Fukui-lshikawa:  While textiles  producers in Fukui-lshikawa receive support from  a
number of institutions, this section focuses mainly on industry associations. Several  voluntary
associations are organized at  the  subsectoral level, such as the  Industry Association  of
Twisting  Firms and the Industry Association of Local Wholesalers. More important are two
semi-public industry associations: the Industry Association of Structural Reform of Weaving
Houses (Fukui-ken Orimono Kozo Kaizen Kumiail and the  Industry Association of  Textile
Products (Fukui  Sen'i Kyokai). Subsector industry groups maintain close associations with the
two  semi-public  industry associations;  indeed in Fukui prefecture, many have their offices on
the same floor of the same building.
Industry associations do not offer technical or financial assistance to firms.  Rather
their main functions are to improve comrmunication  among firms, to assist in communication
between firms  and the local and national government, and to  organize trade fairs,  public
lectures, and other activities for the workers of the member firms.  They also collect industry
data and conduct research on foreign competitors.  The small size of the associations, most
Of which have fewer than 10 officials, precludes them from providing more extensive forms
of  support.  The role of the  Industry Association of Structural Reform of Weaving Houses
differs from that of other industry associations. Although the association has  a tradition dating
back to the late 1  800s (Table 111-3),  since 1967 it has become the window for various public
loan programs and  subsidies.  These public financial  support  programs have been used
extensively for replacement  of old machines  by new equipment (such as water-jet looms, air-
jet  looms, double twisting  machines, and repia-type looms; see  Table 111.3).
-Ohta:  Because the small and medium auto parts suppliers of Ohta have relied most
extensively  on financial support, we concentrate our discussion first  on financial  support
systems in Ohta, and then on other supporting institutions.
14Financial assistance in the  1950s and 1960s  was provided under the  Machinery
Industry Promotion Temporary Measures  Law (1956) and the Electronic Industry Promotion
Temporary Measures  Law (1957).  Support was provided  to industry associations as well as
individual  firms.  To take advantage  of this resource, a number of industry associations were
set  up in Ohta and other parts of Japan.  As of  1992 Ohta had more than 30  industry
associations, including four machinery and metal industry associations for the auto parts
industry. Beyond  obtaining  public loans,  their activities have been limited mainly to organizing
social gatherings.  The Ohta Machinery and Metal Industry Cooperative  Association, IOhta
Kikai Kinzoku  Kogyo Kumiail  is the oldest, established  in 1961. It has only two officials in its
secretariat,  one engaged  in clerical  work, and an annual  budget of 7 million yen, most of which
comes from membership  fees from its 148 members.
Machinery and metal industry associations in Ohta have not been more active in part
because  influential parts producers are already  heavily involved with associations organized
under their parent firms.  The Subaru Hiyu-kai association has 217  auto parts producers
affiliated  with  Fuji Heavy Industries, including 70 first-tier  subcontractors from  Ohta.  At
meetings,  members of  Subaru Hiyu-kai actively  exchange business information  among
themselves, and also with Fuji Heavy Industries.
The presence  of other manufacturing  sectors in Obta (such as electrical  machinery and
textiles) make it difficult for public organizations  such as the city office and the chamber of
commerce  to focus solely on the auto parts industry.  Despite this lack of sectoral focus, the
Ohta chamber  of commerce  actively promotes Ohta's auto parts producers (along  with other
businesses in the region).  The Ohta chamber, established in 1947,  currently has 3,162
members, 23 secretariat members, and an annual budget of 200 million yen.  In addition to
providing managerial assistance, the chamber sends out information on SME policies to
member firms  and lobbies for  SMEs in Ohta.  It also acts  as an intermediary for  SMEs
interested in obtaining loans from public as well as private sources.
111-2.  Characteristics of Samrole  Firms
Differences in size, history, and other characteristics often affect the behavior and
performance of firms.  For example, a large firm with  a long history tends to  have better
access to  loans than  a smaller, younger firm.  Similarly, differences in the  educational
15background ard job experience  of the firm's owners may lead to differences in patterns of
acquiring technological capability.  Owners with  an engineering degree may  be  more
technologically  innovative than those from  other backgrounds, for  instance.  Additional
background on the  general characteristics of  our  sample firms  may therefore facilitate
interpretation of the survey results.
Tsubame:  All of the sample firms in Tsubame are silverware producers rather than
polishers. Our  40 interviews covered  approximately  6 percent of the 700 silverware  producers
in the area. Table 1114  shows that the sample  firms had an average  of 54.2 employees,  with
most of them employing less than 80 workers.  Eight firms (20 percent of the sample) are
engaged solely  in  subcontracting  work,  while  the  remainder consign  processing  to
subcontractors.  Most of the parent firms are also engaged  in subcontracting. Although the
precise number was not obtained, the average number of subcontractors per parent was
approximately 20.
All but one of the sample  firms were set up before  the 1  9BOs,  with most of them starting
operations in the 1950s or 1  960s.  In general the larger the firm, the longer the years in
operation. Most owners and managers  are  in their 40s and 50s and hold a high school diploma
with an engineering  specialization. A large number of these owners started their silverware
business  as a spin-off from a previous  employer. The younger generation of owners, usually
second-generation  in the business,  tend to have a university education.
Fukui-lshikawa:  Table 111-5  shows the size and time of establishment of the sample
firms.  All employ less than 200 workers and most have less than 100 employees. Out of the
33 firms we interviewed, 17 started their business  after World War 11.  But even most of the
firms established after the war have been  in business  for more than 30 years.
Only seven  of 33 owners are  first-generation. Two-thirds of the owners are in their 50s
and 60s, and 19 have university  degrees. Compared  to the other industries we examine, the
educational  background of the textiles producers is quite high.  Typically, the owner worked
in a large trading company or chemical company in Tokyo or Osaka for four or five years
before  joining a firm managed  by his father or a relative.  His experience  in a trading company
or chemical  company  gave him not only technical and marketing  skills but also useful contacts,
which are important in managing  a textile weaving company.
16Ohtj:  Table 111-6  illustrates some  basic characteristics  of the sample  firms in Ohta. The
majority of automobile  part producers  in Ohta have less  than 50 employees,  as do our sample
firms.  There  are only six first-tier suppliers  in our sample, five of which employ more  than 100
workers.  Twenty-five firms began  operations after 1955, and eleven began  operations after
1970.  Three  firms  that  went  into  business before  World  War  11  are now  first-tier
subcontractors to Fuji Heavy Industries.
Our sample  shows that Nakajima  Hikoki Seisakusho  (Nakajima  Airplane Manufacturing
Company,  or Nakajima  Hikoki  for short), which was superseded  mainly by Fuji  Heavy Industries
and Sanyo Electronics  after WWII, played  an important role in nurturing Ohta's parts suppliers.
Among the six first-tier suppliers, three were started by people who had been working in
Nakajima  Hikoki and two were suppliers to Nakajima  Hikoki before WWIr. 25 The background
of the smaller  firms is more  diverse. Among the 30 firms that provided information, six were
started  by previous employees of Nakajima Hikoki or Fuji Heavy Industries, and 19 were
started by people working for suppliers of Fuji Heavy Industries.
The owners and managers  are mostly in their 40s and 50s, and 19 of them are first-
generation. Their educational  level is relatively low compared  to the other industry cases, as
six of them had only a junior high school education.
IV.  Acquisition of Technolocical Ca[abilitv by SMEs
This  section  identifies  the  mechanisms through  which  Japan's  SMEs acquired
technological capability, paying particular attention to the role of public support in that effort.
Two approaches  have been  used in each of the three industry cases. One  is a historical review
of how the industry developed  technological capability, mainly using published studies  and
documents. The other examines  recent experience  in acquiring  technological capability, based
on the results of our interview surveys.  After presenting each case study, this section will
conclude by discussing lessons  for SME  technology policies.
Collective technical support acted as both a direct and indirect catalyst to innovation
in the initial period  when these industries  took root.  In subsequent periods, private channels,
such as subcontracting  parent firms and material  and equipment  suppliers,  have generally been
the dominant source of technical support. Public  technical support at the local level functions
-rWe could not get an answer  to the company  origin question  from one firm.
17to a large degree  as a node in a network, rather than as a direct means  of support. Such
support often facilitates  communication  among  private  firms that might otherwise  not have
taken place.  Our findings  thus indicate  that public  technical  support  has played  at most a
modest  role in directly  helping  to build  the technological  capability  of SMEs.
IV-1. Public  SuPort for Acouisition  of Technological  Cagability  by SMEs
Public assistance  for upgrading  the technological  capability  of SMEs  can be broadly
divided into three groups:  provision  of preferential  loans, fiscal measures,  and technical
assistance. In this section  we examine  these three  types in turn.' 6
Preferential  loans  have  been provided  to SMEs  since 1954 under  the Chusho  Kigyo
Shinko  Josei-Ho  IThe Law on Financial  Assistance  on SME  Promotion]  27 for investment  to
modernize  and upgrade  facilities. The loans,  for up to 50 percent  of the investment  cost,
were provided  by local  governments  at no interest  and with 5-year  maturity. Funds for this
program were provided by the central government. Loans  totalling 1  5 billion yen were
provided  under  this program  in 1965,  equivalent  to 2.1 percent  of fixed investment  (704  billion
yen) by SMEs  in manufacturing. 29
Preferential  loans  from the Small  Business  Finance  Corporation  and the Japan  Small
Business  Corporation  became  available  following revisions  of the law in subsequent  years.
These loans  targeted designated  sectors whose modernization  the government  considered
necessary  for improving  competitiveness. The program  has continued  and in 1990, loans
extended  under  the equipment  modernization  program  totalled  45 billion  yen, only 0.8 percent
of fixed investment  by SMEs  in manufacturing. These  public loans  did, however,  facilitate
additional  SME  loans  from other  sources.
Two types of public fiscal measures  are used  to promote  acquisition  of technological
capability by SMEs: provision  of subsidies  and preferential  tax treatment.  Subsidies  are
provided  to SMEs  and  SME  industry  associatioins  to promote  research  and  development.  They
are also provided  to national  and  local  technical  institutions  to undertake  R&D  related  to the
technologies used by SMEs.  For fiscal  1991, 3.5  billion yen was  budgeted  for  such
26 See  Small and Medium Enterprise  Agency (1991 b and 1992) for details.
27 See section VI for more details on financial afsistance.
2I Shoko Chukin Bank (1  987), p. 335.
18subsidies. 29 Preferential  tax treatment is applied  to R&D  expenditures. Specifically, SMEs may
deduct a fixed proportion of R&D expenditures from taxable income.  A special depreciation
allowance  is also applicable to  machinery and equipment under the  SIMJE  Modernization
Program, which  provides incentives for SMEs to  install new  and improved equipment to
upgrade technological capability.
National and local governments provide a variety of other opportunities for  SMEs to
upgrade  technological  capabilities. 30 Seminars on  technologies  are  offered  by  local
governments as  well  as by  such SME-related institutions  as the  Japan Small  Business
Corporation.  These seminars cover basic theories as well as their applications for  specific
sectors.  They may last from  a few  days to  a year, and are usually financed equally by
sponsoring institutions and participants.
Local governments also offer individualized  technical advice and information to SMEs.
Under  this program, a technical adviser or team of technical experts (from the private sector,
public research institutes or universities)  is sent to SMEs upon request to provide information
-about  technological upgrading. SMEs  can also obtain technical assistance  from local technical
centers.
Finally, SMEs may benefit from other services at local research laboratories, such as
testing  of  new  materials  and products.  Presently, approximately  170  public  research
laboratories  are operated  by local governments. Technical  experts-at these laboratories attend
saminars and training courses sponsored by central and local governments so that they can
provide up-to-date technical information to  SMEs.
IV-2. Technological Sunport Systems in the Tsubame Silverware Industry
Historical Develooments: Manufacturers in Tsubame have experienced a number of
technological changes since the mid-1700s,  when nail production, the  root of  silverware
production, began. 3"  Major technological breakthroughs  included: the start of nail production
(1  700s),  the  start  of fork  production (1911),  the mechanization of  silverware  production
29  Small and Medium Enterprise  Agency (1  991a). appendix  p.22.
J  For  details, see Small and Medium Enterprise  Agency (1992).
3'  See Shimoda  and Kasahara  [19911  and Sasage  [1971 and 1977] for detailed descriptions  of the history of Tsubame.
19(1  920s), the start of knife production (1  920s), the use of  stainless-steel (1  950s),  and the
development of new polishing methods (1  950s).
Of these technological breakthroughs, the public sector took the initiative only in the
case of nail production, when a Tsubame official invited nail producers from Edo (Tckyo) to
teach nail production to  village manufacturers.  For other technological breakthroughs, the
private sector took the initiative.  ICichiemon  Sasage, a local trader, produced the first fork  in
1911  in  response to  an order from  a Tokyo trading  house.  Other manufacturers  with
experience in metal production followed  Sasage's example and started producing forks.
Successful fork production led to orders for spoons, which began to be produced in the mid-
191  Os using basically the same production technique as forks.  To meet increased demand,
silverware  producer3 sought  mechanized systems of  production.  The  first  machine for
silverware production was developed in 1921 by a private equipment manufacturer located
near Tsubame.
Although they n ay not be considered  major breakthroughs, a number of technological
improvements  have taken  place in silverware production  since the  1960s,  such  as the
development of high quality stainless steel and the development of new products such as a
variety of housewares. The role of the public sector in these improvements has been limited
mainly to testing.  Successful development  of a new material called 18-12 (18 chrome and 12
nickel) stainless steel by Oizumi Bussan,  a medium-sized  producer, followed a typical pattern.
Research  and development  was undertaken  jointly with Nippon Yakin, a large material producer
located outside of Tsubame, with which Oizumi  Bussan  had a long business  relationship. The
local technical center was used for testing the new material.
Sources and Evaluation  of Technical  Supoort: The technological gains of the immediate
post-war period provided  the springboard  for a major expansion  of silverware exports.  Indeed,
in the mid-1  950s, the export-output ratio exceeded  90 percent. The growth rate of silverware
production started to decrease  in the 1  960s as restrictions on the part of importing countries
slowed Japan's export sales. An increase  in Japanese  wages and the appreciation  of the yen
further reduced  growth momentum. Rapid  progress on the part of other Asian countries also
affected Japanese exports unfavorably.  In the mid-1  9BOs,  rapid yen appreciation caused a
drastic  decline in  export  sales  and posed a  serious challenge to  silverware  producers.
20Silverware producers adopted various coping strategies, Including quality  upgrading,
development  of new products,  technology  improvement,  and cost reduction.
Almost all the firms regarded  their own efforts as a primary  source  of technological
Llpgrading  (Table IV-11. Next to their own efforts they ranked  reverse  engineering,  Joint
technological  development,  and  patents as other important  sources  of technology,  although
their respective  importance  is significantly  lower.  Design,  a crucial factor In determining
success  or failure of a product,  is believed  to be copied  by competitors  in Tsubame. Indeed,
the fact that copying  has  been  widely  practiced  among  silverware  and housewares  producers
in  Tsubame  appears  to have  contributed  to the success  of production  in Tsubame  by putting
pressure  on innovative  firms to develop  new products and improve  technologies. Formal
channels  such as joint technological  development,  patents,  and  technology  ties are used  for
technology  acquisition  by approximately  30 percent  of the firms. Large  firms, which engage
in the development  of new products  more  actively  than  smaller  firms,  tend  to use  these  formal
channels  with greater  frequency  than small  firms.
Silverware  producers  have  utilized  various  types  of technological  support  (Table  IV-2).
More than 50 percent  of the respondents  received  technical  support  from parent firms and
public  technology  support  agencies  such  as prefectural  technical  centers.  The  technical  center
engages  in research  and development,  exchange  of technical information  with firms and
universities, and provision  of technical assistance  to small and medium  firms.  At Sanjo
technical center near Tsubame,  three types of assistance  --  hosting seminars,  sending
technical  advisers,  and  providing  testing  services  - are available.  In fiscal year  1992,  technical
advisers  were scheduled  to visit 50 firms  over  a total of 240 work-days. Very small  firms do
not use technical  centers  as much as large firms (Table  IV-3), because  they tend to be less
engaged in technologically-oriented  activities.
Following parent firms and the public technical center, other popular sources of
technical support include  equipment  suppliers,  firms in the same business, and industry
associations.  As many as 30  percent of the  producers  received support from these
institutions. Technical  literature,  the chamber  of commerce,  private  consulting  firms, buyers,
and  universities  are  more  limited  sources  of technological  support,  used  by less  than a quarter
of the respondent  firms.
As for the usefulness  of technical  assistance,  support  from  parent  firms scored  highest,
averaging  3.8 on a scale  of 1 to 5 (Table  IV-4}.  Medium-sized  producers  with 30 to 80
21employees gave the highest score to technical support from parent firms, with all five firms
in this size category giving such support the ranking of 5 (the highest score).  Support from
equipment  suppliers  ranked  next highest, with an average  score  of 3.2, although the evaluation
of such support by producers  varies widely:  five firms ranked it 5, or most useful, while four
firms gave it a score of just 1. Technical  support from public sources,  (i.e. the public  technical
center, industry associations,  chambers  of commerce and universities) scored relatively low.
Four users, all of them relatively  large  firms, gave high scores, but other respondents  felt that
the assistance  provided by these public  support institutions was out-of-date and/or difficult to
use commercially.
The interview results bring out an interesting contrast in the evaluation of technical
support by small and large firms (Table IV-4).  For small firms, technical support from other
firms in the same  business  and  from equipment  suppliers  ranks  relatively  high, while large  firms
are more enthusiastic about assistance from  the technical center.  Such differences in
evaluation  indicate the different approaches  to technology by firms of different sizes. Building
on their  own  ideas and efforts,  large and leading firms  develop new  technologies with
assistance from  parent firms and the technical center, while small firms obtain established
technologies  from parent firms and other firms in the same business,  with  limited assistance
from public institutions.
Development of A New Material: The Case of Aovoshi Seisakusho; Aoyoshi Seisakusho,  a
medium-sized silverware producing firm,  developed silverware with  a handle made from
"shape-memory"  polymer in 1990.  The product, named "WILL," has a special handle  that can
be changed  into any shape  to suit the need  of the user, since shape-memory  polymer  becomes
flexible in hot water. Once set, the materiai solidifies and maintains  the desired  shape.
The idea for this product came  from Yoshiro Aoyagi, the founder and president  of Aoyoshi
Seisakusho, out of  his concern for  handicapped and aged persons, several of  whom  are
employed by the company.  Aoyagi attended a number of seminars  and exhibitions on new
materials on the basis of information obtained from his own information network and public
support institutions such as the chamber  of commerce and the Japan Metal Flatware Industry
Association.  He experimented  with various types of materials, before he came across the
shape-memory  polymner.  This naw material was being developed  by a company named Enaki,
a subcontractor for the giant Mitsubish.  Heavy Industries.  As head of small company in a local
22city,  Aoyagi used Shinanogawa Technopolis, a public research center in Niigata, to  make'
contact with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. Through  a two-year joint research  with Enaki,  which
was introduced  to Aoyoshi Seisakusho  by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, the new material was
successfully developed and applied to  silverware.  Without  assistance from  Shinanogawa
Technopolis, it would have been almost impossible  for Aoyoshi Seisakusho  to conduct joint
research  with Mitsubishi and its subcontractor.
The new product, WILL, has received  several  awards for  creativity in contests hosted by
supporting institutions.  With the attention given to WILL through trade fairs and the mass
media, the  product is off  to  a good start,  and Aoyoshi Seisakusho is in the  process of
obtaining patents for the new product.
IV-3 Acguisition of Technological  Capabilitv for Weaving Houses  in Fukui-lshikawa
Historical Developments: Small and medium textile producers  in Fukui-lshikawa  have
profited  substantially from technical support provided by the public sector, in the form of
technical information and training as well  as financial support for  the  purchase of  new
machines.
The textile  industry in Fukui got its start with assistance from the .Fukui prefectural
government in the early 1  900s, which introduced the technology for the production of  silk
products ("Habutae") from the Kiryu region in Gumma Prefecture. A number of middle-class
landlords in the prefecture were enthusiastic  about the silk textile industry, and the firms they
established became the  root of the successful textile  industry in subsequent years.  The
technical center run by the local Fukui  government  played  an important role in introducing and
disseminating the  technology  for  rayon  production  in the  1910-30  period.  The  local
government also sent  special missions to  Europe to  purchase new  machines for  rayon
production.
The importance  of technical assistance  from the public  sector in Fukui  diminished  in the
post-war period  as the private sector, especially  large chemical  and trading companies, began
to  play a greater role in introducing new products and technologies.  Nylon, invented by
Dupont and introduced to Japan by Toray, a leading chemical company, was woven in the
Fukui region without  much time  lag.  Polyester, invented in the  United  Kingdom and
23commercially developed  in the United States, was introduced to this area by Sakai Sen'i, a
leading  weaving firm.  Even  so, the technical center remained  important as a disseminator of
technologies that  large firms would not readily disclose to SMEs.  Since 1971, the public
technical centers have been  engaged  mainly in testing materials  and products for SMEs  rather
than in disseminating  technical skills.  The focus of public support for the industry shifted to
providing financial support for the installation of new machines.
The Impact of Recent  Yen ADoreciation  on Acauisition of Technologies  by SMEs:  The
rapid yen appreciation after 198532  weakened  the competitive position of textiles woven by
Fukui  producers. As a result, as many  as 75 percent of the respondents  to our survey adopted
a strategy of introducing new products to the market. Specifically, a number of producers in
Fukui made serious efforts to  shift  to  a new synthetic material in order to  differentiate
themselves  from foreign competitors. As Table IV-4 indicates, more  than half the respondents
relied  in this effort on technical support from various sources, in particular from parent firms,
equipment  suppliers,  and the public technical  center. In contrast, technical  support from other
firms in the weaving industry, industry associations,  and universities was very limited.
Out of 30 textile  producers interviewed, 27 firms, or 90 percent, utilized technical
assistance  from parent firms, and two-thirds of the firms gave such assistance a rating of 5,
the highest  score. The smallest weaving houses in particular gave technical assistance from
their parent firm the highest score (Table lV-5).  These results highlight the importance of
chemical companies and, to a lesser degree, trading houses, in the acquisition by SMEs of
technical skills  for  new textile  products.  Several weaving  houses noted that  chemical
companies  sent technical personnel  to them when they started weaving new materials. Some
weaving houses  teamed with chemical  firms in a partnership  to develop new products. Among
the  24 respondents to  the  question about sources of  ideas for  new products,  16 firms
answered  that they obtained crucial assistance  or suggestions from the chemical companies
for the introduction of such items as new synthetic fiber products, computer ribbons, new
industrial materials, and synthetic fiber kimonos.
Next to the parent firms, equipment  suppliers  are a popular  source of technical support
(Table  lV\4).  Ten of the 20 firms utilizing such  assistance  give it a score of 5, although 6 firms
gave it  a score of 2.  Relatively small firms gave such assistance a higher score laveraging
32  'The  yen appreciated  from 250 yen per dollar in 1985 to 125 yen per dollar  in 1988.
244.1),  and highlighted the  usefulness of  engineers sent by the  equipment firms  to  teach
employees  to use new machines,  such as modern  waterjet and air-jet looms and double twister
machines. Firms  with 100 or more workers gave support by equipment suppliers an average
score  of only 2.3.  This contrast reflects differences in the internal technological capabilities
of firms of different sizes.
More than half of the respondents listed the public technical center as a source of
technical support.  Large  firms were the most common recipients, while none of the smallest
firms reported using the center. The technical center can be a convenient place to get quick
answers. As one local government  bureaucrat  noted,  the Fukui  technical  center received  5497
inquiries in 1991, of which about 4000 were related to the textile industry.  Typical inquiries
included questions about "how to  adjust the  loom," "the  easy way to  make double-size
weaving,"  "how to weave nylon yarn," and "how to use new twisting  machines."  Most of
the inquiries were handled  by phone, although one of the center's 19 technical advisers can
be sent out under the "adviser system" for complicated questions.  In 1991, the center sent
advisers to 70 companies. It takes an adviser an average of three to four days to complete
assistance  for one inquiry. Most inquiries  came  from very small weaving houses,  which seems
inconsistent with  the interview findings.  This inconsistency may be due to the way the
questions  were posed. We asked about using technical  assistance  for the development  of new
products or processes,  rather  than use  of technical center in general. It therefore seems  likely
that the smallest firms use the technical center for problems  that arise from normal business
practices such as equipment operation, but not for technical assistance with innovations.
Despite extensive use of public technical centers by relatively large producers, their
evaluation of the effectiveness of such support varies widely.  Specifically, four firms gave it
the lowest  score of 1, while three firms gave it the highest score of 5.  This wide variation
may reflect differing expectations of the technical center.  The firms giving low scores tend
to have successfully used the technical center in the past, and thus have high expectations.
However, such expectations  are  often not realized  now, since the technology level has become
so  sophisticated  that  only  large  companies  such  as  chemical firms  and  machinery
manufacturers can keep up.  Technical centers still  play an important  role in  providing
inspection and technical analysis  services, however.
25IV-4.  Acquisition of Technological  Capability in the Automobile Parts Industry in Ohta
Historical Developments:  The roots of the automobile industry in Ohta date back to 1918,
with the establishment of the airplane manufacturing firm known as Nakajima Hikoki.  With
the outbreak of war in Manchuria  in 1931 and World War II in 1941, Nakajima Hikoki rapidly
increased  production of military airplanes  and soon became  the largest airplane manufacturer
in Japan.  Workers came from around the country, and the number of company employees
shot up from 619 in 1927 to 49,591 in 1944.
With the end of World War II, Nakajima  Hikoki was dissolved, and some of its former
employees  established  Fuji Industries. Fuji Industries began  producing  electric parts and small
motors, and in 1946 manufactured  the first Japanese motor scooter.  In 1958 Fuji Industries
began producing the Subaru 360, a subcompact car, and automobile production expanded
rapidly after 1960.
At  the same time that  Fuji Industries was set up by former employees of  Nakajima
Hikoki, other former employees  started their own finns, mainly in the machinery  sector. It was
only  natural for  them  to  engage in business with  nearby Fuji Heavy Industries, which
increasingly required close coordination with  parts producers to  manufacture automobiles
efficiently.  This is how the subcontracting  system centering on Fuji Heavy Industries formed
in Ohta in the 1  950s and 1  960s.
The reqion's automobile  parts suppliers  gradually  expanded  their business  relationships
with other suppliers, including Honda  and Nissan. Technology transfer from parent firms to
their subcontractors  was an important source  of technology acquisition. But it was not just the
private sector that  contributed to upgrading the technological capability of the auto parts
producers.  Fuji Heavy Industries and related automobile parts producers received public
assistance  in the form of import protection and preferential financial and fiscal treatment for
the  purchase of  modern equipment under the  Machinery Industry Promotion Temporary
Measures  Law 11956).  This public sector role in the acquisition  of technological capability by
Ohta's automobile  parts producers  has diminished  over time.  As will be discussed more fully
below, based on interview results, the role of the parent firm remains  essential to automobile
parts producers, most of whom engage in subcontracting.
26Sources of Ideas  for New Products  and New Production Process: Faced  with stagnating sales
in the mid-i 980s, automobile parts producers basically adopted two  strategies - to broaden
their product lines and to improve efficiency in production. Some automobile parts producers
started producing parts such as electric wires and floppy disks for the electronics industry.
The technologies  required  for the production of these electronic parts were basically  the same
as those used for auto parts production. Moreover,  major electronics  producers such as Sanyo
Electronics and  Mitsubishi  Electronics were  located in Ohta.  At  the  same time,  many
automobile parts producers installed such new  equipment as numerically controlled  (NC)
machines, which  were useful  not only in improving productivity  but also in reducing the
number of workers needed, which was important in dealing with labor shortages.
Firms listed their "own efforts," as the most important source of new ideas leading to
the development of new products and/or equipment (Table IV-61. The next important source
of  ideas was the suggestions of parent firms, with close to 50 percent of the respondents
acknowledging  such support. These  two sources  can be closely related: A suggestion is often
given by the parent firm, based on which the parts producers will come up with their own
more concrete ideas.  One firm developed a new auto part after learning that  its parent firm
needed new parts for  a new  model.  Five respondents said they  received ideas for  new
products while attending seminars  or training sessions  at their parent firms.  Three firms noted
that exhibitions sponsored  by industry associations  and the local chamber  of commerce proved
quite  useful for  getting information not only on the state of  art  technologies but  also on
products  developed by  other  firms  in the  same business.  Two  respondents noted  the
usefulness of suggestions made by the technical center.
Sources  of Technical  Suoport and Their Effectiveness: To convert ideas into new products and
production technologies, automobile parts producers utilize technical support from  various
sources. Table IV-7 shows that parent firms are  the most popular source of technical support,
with  24 out of 33 firms utilizing such help.  Small firms tend to use technical support from
their  parent firms  more than large firms  (Table IV-8).  Recognizing the almost one-to-one
correspondence  between the size  of the firm and its position in the subcontracting chain, this
observation indicates that lower-tier subcontractors rely more on technical support from their
parents than higher-tier subcontractors.
Equipment  suppliers  are another popular  source of technical support, with 21 out of 33
firms using such support.  Firms in the same line of business  also provided technical support,
27with one-third  of the respondents  receiving  such support. Other sources  of collective  technical
support (including  the public technical center, technical literature, industry associations, and
universities) are less popular among Ohta's automobile parts producers.
Turning to the evaluation  of technical support, one finds a relatively low score of 3.3
given  to support provided by the parent firms. The help of equipment suppliers,  who provide
such services as training workers for the use and maintenance of new machines, is more
highly rated.  Although not as commonly used, the technical support provided by the public
technical center and universities  is highly regarded  by some  automobile  parts producers.  One
of three firms that received  technical support  from the universities  gave it a ranking  of 5, while
the others gave it  a 4.  The firm  giving a score of  5 received assistance in the form  of
university experiments with the development of a pipe used for melting snow on the street.
The other firms also received  assistance  in the form of technical experiments  relating to their
new products.
The types of technical center support services that  ranked highly among auto parts
producers  are product quality inspections and acquisition  of new technologies. The technical
center does not have the necessary  skills to develop new technologies itself, but it can help
in such other ways as organizing study groups for the development of new technologies.
Another  interesting form  of  assistance provided by the technical center is the  loan of
expensive machines  for experimental  use.  One technical center loaned expensive machines
to a firm that was attempting to develop laser  technology  for measuring  the surface of metals,
and requested  that the firm report the results of the various technical analyses  it conducted
with the machines.
IV-6.  Lessons  for Technoloav Policy toward SMEs
Private channels such as parent firms, equipment suppliers, and firms in the same
business, have been shown to be the dominant sources of technological capability acquired
by SMEs.3 Public technical support, provided mainly through technical centers, plays a
subordinate role - although its  role was more important in the early stages of  industry
development. Rapid  technological  progress  has made it difficult for public institutions, whose
activities  are constrained by financial as well  as human resources, to  keep up with  the
33 Surveys  conducted  by MITI's small and med  iim enterprise  agency in the mid-1  960's yielded  similar results.
28technological capabilities of the private sector, especially large parent firms and equipment
suppliers.
Despite the  diminishing role of  public support in the  acquisition of  technological
capability by SMEs, the public sector still makes a variety of contributions.  First, the public
sector  may  assist  SMEs in  obtaining technical  information through  its  well-developed
networks. Second,  the public sector may provide  useful testing services  for new materials  and
new products.  These functions are particularly helpful to very small firms and independent
SMEs, whose access  to private sources of technical assistance can be limited.
V. Marketing SuDDort Systems
SMEs in general  do not have the resources  to explore their own markets. Instead, they
depend heavily on their trading partners for marketing  of their products, within the framework
of local production networks and subcontracting relationships. Silverware is a final product,
and marketing efforts of  silverware manufacturers and trading houses are important.  By
contrast,  for  synthetic  fiber  textiles  and  automobile parts  both  intermediate  product,
subcontracting relations and local production networks play key roles in marketing.
In all three subsectors, most firms find their marketing needs  satisfied by these inter-
firm relations, and they make no use of public marketing support.  A small number of SMEs
do utilize public support, however, when they enter a new market or launch new products
directly,  rather than through the  intermediation of  other firms.  Public sector marketing
assistance  to SMEs  is provided  mainly through industry associations  and the chamber  or board
of commerce, regardless  of whether the markets are domestic or overseas. This assistance
takes such forms as the hosting of trade fairs, sponsoring  of exploratory tours, and provision
of market information.
In the  case of  export marketing, industry associations and the  chamber/board of
commerce are  usually assisted by the Japan External  Trade  Organization  (JETRO).'  Reliance
on JETRO  for foreign trade information increased rapidly during the 1  960s, with the number
of  inquiries rising from  6,026  in  1961  to  21,882  in  1970.35  Requests from  Japanese
34ln addition to  supporting  the organizations,  JETRO,  which at present has 77 overseas  offices, provides information on
overseas  markets to SMEs. JETRO  not only accepts inquiries  from SMEs  about overseas  markets but also introduces  foreign
buyers  to SMEs.  Assistance  provided  by JETRO  for the promotion of exports appeared  to have been particularly  helpful in the
early  post-WWII  period,  when obtaining  information  on foreign  markets  was difficult.  A questionnaire  survey conducted  in 1955
shows  that 61 percent of the participants  in trade fairs organized  by JETRO  thought that the fairs had positive  effects in the form
of sales  expansion  and development  of new sales  channels,  while 26 percent  thought that they did not have any effects (JETRC
(19731,  p. 3811.
29companies for  introductions to  foreign buyers and consultations on trading practices were
popular in the early to  mid-1960s, while in the late 1960s, foreign buyer inquiries about
Japanese  exports increased  substantially. 3"
V-1. Silverware
Table V-I summarizes  the distribution channels for 29 sample silverware firms from
Tsubane.  Channels  vary, depending  on whether the product is destined for the domestic or
export market. On the domestic market, as much as 90 percent of all products coming from
Tsubame pass through trading houses before reaching retail stores, with the remaining 10
percent sold directly to retail stores.  Presently,  approximately  40 percent of total domestic
product sales rely on trading houses  in Tsubame,  and 50 percent go directly to trading houses
located in the place of consumption.
In recent years, a number of producers  have gained a reputation for their high quality
products. As their brand names  become  recognized  by consumers,  direct marketing  - in which
producers  distribute their products  directly to retail stores  - increases. Direct  marketing allows
producers to better control the price of the products, but at the same time it increases  their
risks, as the sale of their products is not guaranteed. Indeed,  all 30 respondents  felt that their
own efforts were most important to successful marketing.  One  firm hired two  marketers  to
visit as many potential buyers as possible. Another firm used a headhunter  to recruit an able
salesperson  from a trading house in Tokyo.
Export marketing by small and medium producers has been conducted mainly through
export trading houses  located in large  cities like Tokyo and Osaka. These  trading houses, plus
foreign importers played  a major  role in the expansion  of silverware exports, prior to World War
11,  although efforts by trading houses in Tsubame also contributed.  Large  producers, which
tend to have more experience  and resources,  began  to trade directly with foreign importers in
the 1  960s, taking advantage  of the opportunity to make larger profits.  Although the number
remains  small, a few firms now have their own overseas  marketing  offices.  An estimated 20
percent of silverware exports are handled  directly by the producer.
3 JETRO,  ibid., p.273.
3eThe  change  in the type of inquiries  received  bV  JETRO  during  the 1960s appears  to reflect changes  in the competitiveness
of Japanese  products  during the same  period. When  Japanese  products  were not competitive  in the early 1  960s, Japanese  finns
were eager  to obtain information on foreign markets  in order to expand export sales. When  Japanese  products became  more
competitive  toward the end of the 1  960s. it was foreign  buyers  that were interested  in obtaining  information on possible  export
items and exporters.
30Marketing support has been  provided  mainly by industry associations  and the chamber
of commerce,  and usually  consists  of hosting  trade fairs and sending  interested  buyers to local
manufacturers. Often public institutions such as JETRO  and the Tsubame  city office provide
additional assistance. 37 The Tsubarne Wholesalers  Cooperative Association specializes in
assisting wholesalers  in Tsubame,  and thus indirectly supports silverware marketing.
Quality- inspection systems also contributed to  the expansion of  exports.  Quality
inspections  were carried  out voluntarily by the industry association  in the pre-war period  to win
and maintain a reputation for  good quality.  In the  post-war period, inspections became
mandatory under  the Yushutsuhin Torishimari-Ho  ([Export Product Control Law] of  1948.
Given the strong direct links among silverware producers, trading houses and their
customers, marketing support from public institutions was not much utilized by the sample
silverware producers, although it is widely available  to them {Table V-2).  On average  about
10 percent of the  respondents used such services.  Of those who used public marketing
support, only a few  producers rated the effectiveness of such services highly; these firms
highlighted the usefulness  of market information and exploratory tours.
V-2.  Synthetic Fiber  Textiles
Textile weaving firms produce intermediate goods for  chemical companies, trading
houses, and wholesalers  under  fee contracts or sales  contracts. As a rule, most firmrs  sell their
products to more  than two firms and in many  cases  to several  firms.  Marketing  channels  often
differ depending  on the type of products.
As noted earlier, in order for weaving houses to increase  their production and sales,
they must introduce new prodL-ats. Indeed, about 40 percent of the sample  firms began to
produce  entirely new products in order to deal  with the problems  brought on by the substantial
yen appreciation. New marketing channels  had to be developed  for these products. Yet even
for new products, weaving houses  tended to rely on parent firms to conduct marketing rather
than cultivating markets on their own.
Marketing assistance  from chemical  companies  and trading firms is highly rated by the
weaving houses  in Fukui-lshikawa  (Table  V-3).  This observation  is not surprising, considering
37For  example, the Tsubame  chamber  of commerce  hosted or co-hosted  four trade fairs in Tokyo and in Tsubame  in fiscal
year 1991, and  transmitted eeB  inquiries  to Tsubame  manufacturers.
31the  importance of the parent firms in almost every aspect of the  subcontracting weaving
houses business  activities.  In contrast, the public sector does not play any essential role in
the introduction and marketing  of new products. The important role of trading houses  in Fukui-
Ishikawa is worth stressing. Many major trading houses  have branches  in this area and make
,1.
continuous  efforts  to  initiate  business with  weaving houses.  Thus, trading  houses and
weaving houses approach each other whenever they see the possibility of a new market.
Trading houses are also involved in such business as the sale of used machines from the
weaving houses of Fukui-lshikawa  to other Asian countries.
V-3,  Automobile Partgt
The industrial organization  of Ohta's automobile  parts industry, discussed in section ll,
is such that auto parts suppliers are tightly organized  under the subcontracting system of Fuji
Heavy Industries,  a major automobile assembler in Ohta.  The evaluation of  marketing
assistance  by  auto  parts producers in  Ohta is shown  in Table V-4.  As  expected,  the
subcontracting auto parts suppliers,  especially the smaller ones, have a relatively high regard
for marketing support from their parent firms.  Marketing  assistance  from the government and
other official organizations gets some credit from firms entering new markets, as four such
firms  gave it  the highest score of 5.  Support from the SME Promotion Center, run by thUa
prefectural government, was especially highly regarded. Some respondents remarked that
their  need for  marketing support from  public sources may increase in the future  as they
diversify and start producing entirely new products.
V4.  Lessons  for Marketing Sun  oort Policies
Our field research  indicates  that SMEs  have not utilized public marketing support much
in  recent years.  Both the  silverware and synthetic  textile industries took  advantage of
assistance with trade fairs in foreign countries during early periods  of their development, when
producers were heavily dependent  on exports and information on foreign markets was largely
unavailable.  Usefulness  of public marketing support depends on the availability of  support
from other sources.  For automobile parts and synthetic fiber textiles, subcontracting relations
are well  established, and there is not much room for  public institutions to  offer  marketing
support.  Public support is somewhat more popular among producers of final products such
as silverware.
32Vi. Financial  SuDnort
This section begins with a review of SME financial assistance since World War II.  It
then turns to an examination of the pattern and effectiveness of financial assistance extended
to each of the three subsectors, with emphasis  on synthetic textiles and auto parts, where
such assistance has had the greatest impact.
VI-1. The Financial  Situation of the SMEs After World WarAi
The financial resources of SMEs  are limited compared  to those of large firms.  SMEs have
limited savings and other forms  of  internal funds  almost by definition.  Lack of  market
credibility and small size precludes SMEs from obtaining funds from capital markets through
such means as issuing bonds.  Consequently, SMEs often have to rely on borrowing from
financial institutions.
During Japan's high growth  period of the  1950s  and 1960s,  SMEs relied heavily on
extemal sources for fixed investment funds.  Since the  1  970s, they have begun to rely more
on internal sources of funds.  SMEs  percentage  share of internal  sources (retained  earnings and
depreciation) in total-financing increased  from 41.0 percent in 1970 to 52.9 percent in 1982,
before starting to decline. 38 The share of long-term borrowing in total SME borrowing from
financial  institutions  increased  from  27.2  percent  in  1970  to  42.8  percent  in  1980  before
declining to  33.0 percent in 1984.  Another notable change was the decline in the share of
borrowing from non-financial  institutions, from 9.4 percent in 1  970 to  3.0 percent in 1  984.39
Loans from  financial institutions often cost more for SMEs than for large firms,  as SME
loans are subject to greater risk and higher transaction costs.0 A survey of loans for fixed
In spite of the significant  increase  recorded  by SMEs,  the share  of intemal sources in total financing for SMEs was notably
smaller than that of  large firrns, whose corresponding  share  reached as much as 67.8 percent in 1983.  The increase in the
importance of internal sources for large firns  was attributable to their favorable economic performance  and sizeable amounts
of depreciation,  which in tum was due to  active fixed investment.
39 The increase in the share  of long-term borrowing and the decline in the share  of non-financial  institutions in the share of
total borrowing for  SMEs resulted from the shift in the sources  of financing by large firms away from financial institutions to
other sources  such as capital markets and  foreign exchange  markets. As a result of increased  importance  of sources other than
financial institutions for funds utilized by large  firms, increasing  amounts of financial resources,  including long-term loans  from
financial institutions, were made available  to SMEs.
'°  Based  on a study by Horiuchi and Shibayama  (1985), the interest rate charged  on loans to SMEs  exceeded  that charged
to  large firms by approximately 0.5-1.0 percentage  point during the expansionary  monetary phase  of the  1970s and 1980s.
This  gap almost disappeared  during the period of tight monetary  conditions. In order to cover the risks associated with lending
to  SMEs, financial institutions often require the borrowing SMEs  to  maintain a certain amount on deposit with the  lending
institutions. Although  details are not available,  one may infer the exte. t of this practice  by computing the proportion of the sum
of cash and deposits to  outstanding loans from the financial institutions.  Between 1965 and 1985 the proportion for SMEs
33investment made to  1,932  large firms and SMEs in 196B indicates that  large firms  (with
paid-in capital exceeding  1 billion yen) had no problem  obtaining  long-term  loans, while a large
number of SMEs had difficulty.  The smaller the firm, the greater the difficulty  it faced in
obtaining long-term loans.  More specifically, only 65 percent of the small firms (i.e., those
with less than 10 million yen of capital) received  the loan amount they requested. 41
VI-2.  Financial  Assistance to SMEs
Financial  assistance  to SMEs  in the post- World War II period began with the provision of
loans and guarantees  from the Reconstruction  Finance  Corporation  in the second half of the
1  940s.  Around 1950, various public as well as private institutions specializing  in the provision
of loans  to SMEs were set up, and their function was strengthened  over time.
Two  public financial institutions specializing  in SME lending, Kokumin Kinyu Koko (The
People's Finance Corporation] and Chushokigyo  Kinyu Koko [The Small Business Finance
Corporation]  were established  in 1949 ard 1953, respectively. Together with  Shoko Chukin
Bank [The Central Bank for  Commercial  and Industrial Cooperatives], established in 1936,
these public institutions provided long-term  loans  to SMEs. The main source of funds for the
People's  Finance  Corporation  and the Small Business  Finance  Corporation  was paid-up capital
provided by the govemment and borrowings from the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program
(FILP). FILP  is run by the government, using surplus funds obtained from the postal savings
and social security funds.  In addition to these sources, in 1984, the Small Business  Finance
Corporation began  to raise funds by issuing government-guaranteed  debt.
These  three public financial institutions specialize  in different aspects  of SME finance. The
People's Finance  Corporation provides loans to small enterprises,  while the Small Business
Finance  Corporation  is  mainly  engaged' in  long-term  lending  for  modernization and
rationalization  purposes. Shoko Chukin  Bank  specializes  in lending  for the institutionalization
of  SMEs.  The terms of  loans to  SMEs from these public financial institutions are more
favorable  than those of private lenders. In particular, these public institutions set up special
fluctuated at close  to 40 percent with a slight downward trend, while the corresponding  proportion  for large  firns  was around
30 percent.
"'See  Chushokigyo  Kinyu-koko  11984], p.189
34loan  programs  in accordance  with SME  policies,  the terms  of which are even  more  favorable
to SMEs  than their general  program  loans.
Between  1960 and 1985,the share  of public  financial institutions  in total SME  lending
hovered  around  10 percent,  with small  fluctuations  and a slight upward trend. In the early
post-World War II period, their share In total  lending for  SME fixed  investment was
substantially  higher  -- 30 percent  in  the 1  960s (See  Table  VI-1l.  The Small  Business  Flnance
Corporation  accounted  for approximately  70 percent  of cumulative  lending  for fixed investment
provided  by the three  financial  institutions  at the end of fiscal-year  1955. Although its share
of investment  lending  by public  institutions  has  since  declined  notably,  it was still the highest
of the three financial  Institutions  at the end of 1989, at 44 percent. By contrast,  the Shoko
Chukin  Bank  has the largest  share  of lending  for working  capital.
To see how effectively these institutions pursued  their objective of making  financial
resources  available  to SMEs,  we examine  the pattern  of public  lending  in relation  to monetary
conditions. Figure  VI-1 depicts  the growth rate  of lending  to SMEs  by three  different  financial
institutions from 1954 to 1962:  SMEs  experienced  acute difficulty obtaining  loans  during
these  years,  since  private  financial  institutions  were  largely  interested  in lending  to large  firms
actively undertaking  fixed investment. One notices  large  fluctuations  in the growth rate of
lending  by the private  banks,  while relatively  stable  growth  in lending  is observed  from private
and public institutions  that specialize  in SME  lending. During  the period  shown, four tight
monetary  situations can be identified. In each  instance,  the growth rate of lending  from the
private  banks  declined,  while the growth rate of lending  from the public  financial  institutions
increased,  offsetting  the private  sector  decline. These  observations  indicate  the effectiveness
of public institutions in providng loans  to SMEs  during  periods  of tight monetary  conditions
when such loans  are most acutely  needed.
In addition to providing  financial  assistance  to SMEs  in dealing  with cyclical problems,
public financial institutions were also able to assist SMEs  in dealing with longer-t-srm  or
structural problems such as modernization  and rationalization. SME modernization  was
actively  sought under  the Small  and  Medium  Enterprise  Modernization  Promotion  Law enacted
in  1963 and revised several times since.  Under the law, the Small Business  Finance
35Corporation was to provide special  loans to designated  industries. 42 For loans from the special
account, preferential interest rates applied. For general  loans, the interest rate was 0.2 to 0.5
percent lower than the prime rate, while for special loans the interest rate was lowered an
additional 0.2 to 0.5 percent. 4 3
Local governments also are actively  engaged in providing loans to  SMEs in their
jurisdictions.  Basically these  loans take  three different  forms.  One takes  the  form  of
consignments to private financial institution, i.e. the iocal government  provides  funds to private
financial institutions, which in tum provide loans  to SMEs. Another form is direct lending from
local governments to SMEs. In the third form, the local government supplements the lending
of  private  financial  institutions  or  central  government financial  institutions  by  providing
financial  resources  for  interest  payments.  Loans under this  program  have  increased
substantially, from  180 billion yen in 1965 to  over 2700 billion yen in 1983,  and are now
roughly equivalent to the amounts disbursed by the Small Business Finance Corporation.  A
large part of the loans are  for working capital, thus mitigating the financial burden of SMEs in
times of tight  monetary conditions."
-The  central government also operates  a credit guarantee and insurance program, called
the public credit supplementation  system. 45 The Credit Guarantee  Associations, located in 52
42For example, more than 20 industries  were designated  under the special program  in the years between 1  .63  and 1965.
Since  then, the number  of designated  industries  has declined. For  the 1964-70 period,  the total amount of financial assistance
given under the law was  153 billion yen, amounting to as much as 18 percert of the cumulative value of  fixed investment
undertaken by SMEs during that period. Of the 153 billion yen total, 90 billion was provided  from the special account.
3 These  values are for the 1971-74 period. See Chushokigyo  Kinyu Koko (1984), Tables  4-2-26 and 42-29.
44The financial lending programs discussed so far apply to  both small and medium enterprises.  There are also  programs
designed  just for small firms. _efined  as manufactur:ng  firms with less than 20 employees  and retail, wholesale,  and services
firms with less than 4 emplo',eas. Two major examj.es of such programs  are the financial lending program  for modemization,
and the  equipmert and machinery leasiag program.  Resources  for these programs come jointly from the  central and local
govemments. The amount of loans  provided  to small firms under  the financial lending  program for modemization, which started
in 1954,  increased from 200 million yen in 1950 to 40  billion yen in 1984.  Although the size of the loans was not large
compared  to those provided under other programs,  these loans contributed  to the moderization  of small firm facilities.
The equipment and machinery leasing  program  for small firms began  in 1966,  in recognition of the fact that they need not
only financial  assistance  but also other kinds  of assistance. Specifically,  it was thought that small  firms suffered  from a shortage
of skilled human resources  able to identify appropriate  machinery and equipment  This led to establishment of the equipment
and machinery  leasing  program, to help firms save money through timely replacement  of old equipment. In addition, technical
guidance provided under the  program  is believed  to  have benefitted small firms. The cumulative value of financial resources
expended  for the  program  from 1966 through 1984 amounted  to 342 billion yen.
451n  the post WWII period,  the credit guarantee  system  was initially administered  at the local  level, while the central government
pursued the credit insurance system.  As for legalization  of the system, the Shinyo Hoken-Ho  [Law on Credit Guarantee]  and
the SNinyo  Hoken  Kyokai-Ho  [Law on Credit Insurance  Associationl were enacted  in 1950 and 1953, respectively. With several
changes  in the system, the Chushokigyo  Shinyo Hoken Koko [The Small  Business  Credit Insurance  Corporation,  which was set
up in 1958, began to play a central role in the public credit supplementation  system.
- r
*  ;e  1  ~~~36cities, provide guarantees to SMEs, and the Credit Guarantee  Associations in turn insure the
guaranteed amount with  the Small Business Credit Insurance Corporation. In  addition to
insurance services, the Small Business Credit Insurance Corporation provides loans to  the
Credit Guarantee  Associations. As Table Vl-2 shows, the amount of loans guaranteed by the
Credit Guarantee  Associations and insured by the Small Business  Credit Insurance  Corporation
has increased remarkAbly over time."
Vl-3.  Financial Assistance from the Firm Perspective
As we have seen  above, the government  has used a large amount of Nnancial resources
to  support SMEs, and a high percentage of SMEs have utilized loans from public financial
institutions  and local governments.  But these facts do not necessarily indicate that  such
financial  support programs have been effective.  Since public financial loan programs offer
favorable loan terms, many SMEs naturally took advantage of the loans. 47 The question is
whether such measures were effective in enhancing the position of the SMEs and inducing
investment expansion  by the firms.  While it is difficult to directly evaluate the effects of the
financial support measures,  the field studies help clarify how the sample  firms viewed various
financial support policies.  Tables VI-3 through VI-7 illustrate the sample firms' evaluation of
the various sources of financial support, including public loan programs. From the distribution
of  scores, one can get a sense of the relative usefulness of financial supports in the three
industries.
Among the three industries, the sample firms  in Tsubame generally score lowest on
utilization of public financial programs. This may be due to the fact that the size of investment
needed  by silverware producers, and thus the need for external-financial assistance, is small.
compared  to other sectors.  We therefore focus only on the cases  of Fukui-lshikawa  and Ohta
in the discussion that follows.
Woven Textiles in Fukui-Ishikawa: A large amount of public financial assistance has
been made available to this industry in the last 20 years, largely for replacing old machines
with  newer high-tech ones.  As of  1992, six financial programs were available in Ishikawa
46The cumulative  values  through 1984 for the respective  programs  reached  over 60 trillion yen.  At the end 1984 the balance
for outstanding loans  under the loan guarantee  program  was 8,551 billion yen, or 7.5 percent of the balance of private loans.
471t  should  be noted  that in dealing  with business  fluctuations,  public  loans  were a much more  stable source  of finance for SMEs
than private loans.
37prefecture. 48 These  programs  consisted  of the following:  (1) Sen'i  Kogyo  Kozo  Kaizen  Jigyo
(Structural Reform Project of  the Textile Industry)",  (2) Setsubi Kyodo Haiki Jigyo
(Coordinated  Equipment  Abolition Program) 50, (3) Sen'i Sangyo  Chukaku  Kigyo  Ikusei  Yushi
Seido  (Loan  Program  for Nurturing  Leading  Textile  Companies)" 5 , (4) Tokutei  Chiiki Chusho
Kigyo  Taisaku  (SME  Support  Policy  for Special  Regions)" 2, (5) Chusho  Kigyo  Setsubi  Kindaika
Shikin (Loans  for  Modernization  of SME Equipment) 53,  and (6) Chusyo Kiyo Koudo ka
Kashitsuke  Jigyo (Loan  Program  for the Sophistication  of SMEsl.5 4
Tables  VI4  and  VI-5 show the average  evaluation  scores  textile firms gave  to various
extemal  sources  of finance. Local  banks  and loan  programs  of the prefectural  government
received  the highest  scores. Financial  support  from  the national  government  (through  industry
associations)  and  public  financial  institutions  also  received  high  scores. 55 These  observations
48 Here  we present  a brief  picture  of financial  suppot policies  based  on a document  of the Ishikawa  prefectural  govemment.
However,  it must  be noted  that the industrial  policies  of the central  government  are  implemented  through  local  govemments.
Therefore,  if one  analyzes  -the  policies  of one  local  govemment,  such  as  Ishikawa  prefecture,  one  obtains  a fairly good  picture
of the national  policies. The  terms of the loans  such as  the interest  rates  and loan  requirements  are  the same  for all the
prefectures.  The  amount  of the  loan  and  the subsidies  differ  among  the regions,  but arm  basically  proportional  to the size  of the
industry  in the region.  The  case  of Ishilawa  analyzed  here  thus captures  the basic  picture  of the loan  program.
49This  is based  on MlTI's  Structural  Reform  Project  of the  Textile  Industry.  The  govemment  has  been  spending  a large  amount
of money  on both  financial  loan  supports  and  subsidies  for the textile industry. Loans  were  provided  at low interest  rates.
ranging  from 0%  to 2%. or about  113  of the market  rate  or less.
5OThis  is a financial  support  program  with which  the  govemment  intended  to reduce  the production  capacity  of textile machines
and  to replace  old  machines  with newer  ones. Loans  for this project  totalled  about  40 billion  yen.
51This  is  a special  loan  program  of the prefectural  govermnent.  The  interest  rate  in 1991  was about  2% lower  than  the market
rate  (5.3%) and  the loan  amount  could  be up to 100  million  yen  or 213  of total expenses.  The  purpose  of this program  is  to
enhance  investment  opportunities  for SMFs  plannirig  to diversify  their  business  activities.
52The  fourth,  fifth and  six  projects  are  general  loan  and  subsidy  programs  of the national  govemment  that can  be used  by the
textile industry. The  interest  rate  on the fourth  program  is 4.4% (in 1992), with loan  limits  of 80 million  yen for physical
investment  and  30 million  yen for operating  expenses.  These  loans  are  provided  only  to 51 areas  (covering  216 cities  and
townsl  specified  by  the national  govemment,  including  20 cities  and  towns  in Ishikawa.
53Under  the fifth program,  interest-free  loans  of up to 30 million  yen  are  provided  to SMEs  that plan  to replace  old  machines.
The  loan  must  be less  than  50% of the amount  of investment.  There  are  38 industries  specified  by the govemment  that can
utilize  this loan  pmgram.
54The  sixth  programi  supports  such  joint activities  of SMEs  as  merging  and  coordinating  equipment  use.
55AIthough  the score  for People's  Flnance  Corporation  (Kokumin  Kinyu  Koko)  is not high,  this may  reflect  our sample  choice.
This  financial  institution  can  lend  only  to very  smal  firms. Most  of the firms  we interviewed  are  larger  than  this category. Note
also  that some  of the firms we interviewed  mentioned  that since  they can utilize  either  loan  programs  of the prefectural
govemment  or loans  from  public  financial  institutions,  they utilized  the former  due  to better  interest  rates.
38indicate that  many firms  depend heavily on outside loans for  their investments.  Parents
companies and the People's-  Finance Corporation, however, did not get high scores.' 6
Table VI-6 desegregates  the scores from Table VI-5 for four subcategories  of firm size.
Local banks scored considerably  higher among larger  firms.  In contrast, smaller firms depend
more heavily on public loan programs, and gave relatively high scores to national government
loan programs, prefectural government  loan programs,  the Small  Business  Finance  Corporation,
and the People's Finance Corporation.  Only four firms among the 31 firms surveyed did not
make use of the  public financial loan. program.' 7 Even excluding Shoko-Chukin, which is
somewhat different in character, 20 out of 31 firms (about 65 percent) utilized the financial
loan programs of the national government or the local prefectural government.  There were
considerable  differences in interest rates between public loan programs and commercial loans,
making public loans worthwhile despite the often cumbersome  procedures required to obtain
them.
All the firms we interviewed were well aware of the kinds of financial support available.
Many mentioned the industry association  as their source for such information.  Several firms
maintain relations with  the  local branch of  public financial institutions,  and several firms
received information from local commercial banks about public financial support programs.
Most public financial support programs  limit the total amount that can be borrowed to a certain
percentage of  the  expense of  new  equipment;  therefore many firms  must  borrow  the
remainder from  commercial banks.  This gives commercial banks an incentive to  let their
customers  know  about  public financial  programs.  Some firms  also  mentioned  a  local
newspaper  that focuses on the synthetic fiber textile industry as a source of information about
loan programs.58
Automobile  Parts in Ohta:  Faced with  an unfavorable business climate in the mid-
1980s,  auto pailts producers in Ohta invested heavily in process innovation and equipment
upgrades.  About 60 percent of the firms use public loans for more than 30 percent of their
560ne firm mentioned  that its parent  finn Ia local  wholesaler)  provided  the weaving  firm with  10  free second-hand  looms during
the difficult period of yen appreciation. This kind of assistance  from parent  companies  occurs occasionally,  but is relatively rare.
57We could not get answers  from two firms on this question.
5SMost  fin-ns  felt that the  special  depreciation  tax treatment for investment was useful.  However, most firms answered "No"
to the  question of whether they would have delayed the timing of their investment if  the depreciation treatment were not
avalable. This indicates  that the special  depreciation  tax nmatment  was not that effective in altering the timing and the  volume
of investment.
L  *  39investments, with about half of them financing more than 60 percent of their investments with
public funds.
Tables VI-7  and VI-8  exhibit  how our sample firms  in Ohta see the  usefulness of
financial loans from various sources. Commercial bank loans get the highest score, followed
by loans from local governments, both prefectural and city.  The picture is quite different if we
divide the sample into different groups by size (Table VI-8).  Loans  from commercial banks are
highly regarded by large firms with 50 or more employees, while local government loans are
more highly regarded by smaller firms.
The evaluation of loans from different public financial institutions also differs according
to firm size.  The Small Business  Corporation is given high ratings by firms with  10 or more
employees,  while the People's Finance  Corporation is regarded highly by firms with less than
20 employees.  The Shoko Chukin Bank is highly regarded by large firms  with  50 or more
employees.  These differing  perceptions reflect the  different  mandates pursued by these
financial institutions: the Small  Business  Corporation  and Shoko Chukin Bank  specialize  in loans
to relatively large SMEs, while the People's Finance  Corporation  specializes  in loans to smaller
firms.  Prefectural government loan programs received a higher score than the loans from
public financial  institutions,  which  probably indicates that,  when  faced with  alternative
programs, firms have chosen the loans that offer the most favorable interest rates.
VIl.  Conclusions
-Small and medium enterprise  policies in Japan cover financing, technical and marketing
assistance, organizational arrangements, and labor relations.  SME policies are basically
formulated by the  national government, and carried out by various public and semi-public
institutions inciuding  the national government, local governments, public financial institutions,
technical centers, the chambertboard  of commerce, and industry associations.
Evaluation  of the effectiveness of SME policies requires examination of the impact of
SME policies not only at the macroeconomic  level but also at the industry and firm level.  In
this  study  we  selected three distinct  industries:  silverware in Tsubame, synthetic  fiber
weaving in Fukui-lshikawa,  and automobile parts in Ohta. We surveyed firms in each industry
on the effect and perceived usefulness of SME policies and institutions related to  technical,
marketing and financial assistance.
40In all three industries,  the SMEs  under study engage in transactions with various kinds
of firms  including parent firms, material and equipment suppliers, trading houses, and rival
firms.  These relations  provide both assistance  and pressure. It is important to understand the
kinds of assistance  transmitted through such "markets" in order to evaluate  the effectiveness
of public support. This is because  the role of public support is generally  to complement  private
support, due to the limitations of public support in both financing and human resource terms.
In the area of technical assistance, we found significant differences in effectiveness
among the three industries.  For the silverware industry in Tsubame and the fiber weaving
industry  in Fukui-Ishikala,  the prefectural technical center and other public R&D institutions
contributed notably to the development  of new products, especially  during the industry's early
development  stages.  However, in both industries,  the role of technical centers seems  to have
become more limited in recent years, as they  can no longer keep pace with  sophisticated
technologies.  They have come to focus increasingly on auxiliary functions such as product
quality testing and technical assistance. Technical  centers never played an important role for
the auto parts industry in Ohta, mainly because  auto parts producers  were heavily involved in
subcontracting with  Fuji Heavy Industries, a large automobile producer.
In the area of marketing assistance, we found that  public institutions  played a very
limited role.  Instead, marketing has been largely an activity of private firms: trading houses
in the  cases of  silverware  and synthetic  fiber weaving, and parent firms  in the  case of
automobile  parts.
Finally, public financial support was found to be particularly useful to the synthetic fiber
weaving and auto parts industries, which require  substantial financial resources  for investment.
Among the  varieties of  public financial supports, loans from local governments are highly
valued because  of the preferential conditions attached to them, such as low interest rates and
lenient collateral requirements.
An important element common to all three cases is the geographical concentration of
SMEs  in respective industries  and their tendency to form local production networks.  This trend
is common for SMEs in other industries  in Japan as well.  Geographical  concentration of SMEs
creates various external economies. For exarnple, strong competition leads to an increase in
allocative  and  technical  efficiency  through  quick  dissemination of  new  technologies.
Production levels may be adjusted easily.  Moreover, employee hiring and development of
human resources become relatively effective.
41Another  important feature related to  geographical  concentration is  the  strong
competition  among  different  regions.  In our interviews  in Ohta,  we often heard  firms express
concern  about  the performance  of firms  producing  similar  products  in rival cities. In fact, this
kind of competition  among  regions  is an important  force in enhancing  industry  performance.
Local  governments  as well as firms may get involved  in competing  with-  each  other.
The importance  of local production  networks  naturally  leads  to questions  about the
relative  role  of public  support  in creating  and  maintaining  such  a system. Our  study  found  that
it was the initiative of SMEs  and  the firms related  to them that played  the crucial  role rather
than  the public  sector.  At the  same  time,  however,  it should  be emphasized  that public  support
systems are  tightly imbedded  in the daily routine  of SMEs  through  such important  activities
as exchanging  information  on the availability  of financial  assistance.  Without public support,
the activities of SMEs  would be hindered. Some  policies  were quite effective at inducing
SMEs  to locate close  to each  other and  at enhancing  interaction  among  firms in a particular
region. The construction  of industrial  parks  should  be mentioned  in this respect.
We have discussed  the effectiveness  of SME policies  from the point of view of
particular  industries  without  explicitly  considering  their  direct  and  indirect  impact  on other  parts
of the economy. As noted  at the outset, one  of the special  characteristics  of the Japanese
economy  is the important  position  of SMEs,  which  exist mostly  as complements  to, rather  than
competitors of, large firms.  Recognizing  this special position of SMEs  in the Japanese
economy  may  lead  to a fuller  appreciation  of the benefits  of SME  policies. Evaluation  of SME
policies  becomes  even  more  complex  when  one  considers  their cost. We have  chosen  not to
comment  on these issues,  but to leave  them as subjects  for future research.
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46TABLE I-1
COLLECTIVE  ORGAN1IATIONS  INVOLVED
WITH  SME POLICIES (Select  List)
National  Level  Aministradon:
MITT,  Small  and Medium  Agency
TeeIical, Managerial,  and Financial  Assistance:
Japan  Small  Business  Corporation
Financial  Assistance:
Small  Business  Finance  Corporation  (main  office)
People's  Finance  Corporation  (main  office)
Shoko  Chukin  Bank  (main  office)
Small  Business  Credit  Insurance  Corporation
Small  Business  Investment  Companies  (3)
Provision  of Information  on Markeing:
Japan  External  Trade  Organization  (JETRO)
Promotion  of Organized  Activities:
National  Federation  of Small  Business  Associations
Nadonal  Association  for Subcontracting  Enterprise  Promotion
Assistance in  Broad  Areas  including Managerial and  Marketing
Assistance-
Japan Chamber  of Comnrce and Industry
Central  Federation  of Boards  of Commere and Industry
Regional Level  Administradon:
Regional  Bureau  of MI
Prefecture and Major  Administradon:
City Level  Division  in Charge  of SMEs  at Prefecmral  Governmt
Provsion of Guidance  in General:
Comprehensive  Guidance Centers for SMEs (59)
Technical  Assistance:
Public  Research  and Testing  Centers  (170)
Provision  of Information:
Regiona Information  Centers (47)
Finandal  Assistance:
Small  Business  Finance  Corpomtion  (583)
People's  Finance  Corporation  (151)
Shoko  Chukin  Bank  (90)
Credit  Guarntee Association  (52)
Promotion  of Organized  Actdties:
Prefecturl Federation  of Small  Business  Associations
Small  Business  Associations  (cooperatives)
Assistance  in Broad  Areas  including  Managerial  and  Marketing  Assistance:
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (507)
Boards  of Commerce  and Industry  (2,384)
Note:  Figures  in parenthcses  indicate  the number  of offices.
Source:  Small  and Medium  Enterprise  Agency  (1991  and 1993b).
47TABLE E-1
U.S. AND  JAPANESE  AUTOMOTIVE  FIIAS: LEVELS  OF  NTERNAL  PRODUCTION
1965-1983  (By Percent)
Nissan  Toyota  GM  Ford  Chrysler
Fiscar  In-House  I  Group  la-House  Group  In-House  In-House  In-House
1965  32  54  41  74  50  36  36
1970  29  52  35  66  49  39  36
1975  22  50  30  73  45  36  36
1979  26  70  29  74  43  36  32
1980  26  73  29  76  - - 34
1981  26  71  28  75  - - 31
1982  26  75  26  70  - - 34
1983  26  78  26  73  - - 28
Sources: Cusunmano  (1989), Table 46.
Notes: Assums  that the level of payments to suppliers (as a percentage of sales) ia  1975 equaled the average for
1974 (64.1 %) and 1976 (64.3  %),since Chrysler did not publish this figure in 1975.
48TABLE II-2
STRUCTURE  OF THE  AUTOMOBILE  INDUSTRY
(Number  of Subcontractors  By Parts
For a Japanese Automobile  Producer)
||lI  DDriving,  1
Engine  Electrical  and Controlling  Braking  Gear  Articles  Chassis  Bod Pas  Other  Total
Parts  Parts  Gear Patns  Parts  PaIts
Ist- tier  25  1  31  is  is  3  41  31  168
subcontractor
2na- tier  912  34  609  792  926  27  1,213  924  5,437
subcontractor
3rd- ticr  4,960  352  7,354  6,204  5,936  85  8,221  8,591  41,703
subcontractor
Total  5,897  387  7,994  7.014  6,880  115  9,475  9,546  47,30
Source:  SME  Agency,  MITI 1977
49TABLE 1-3
TRANSPORT  MACHINERY  INDUSTRY  IN OHTA  - 196)
Size by  Number  of  Number of  Value of Sales  Value Added
Employment  Establishments  Employees  (Y  Million)  (K  Million)
1-9  30  182  1,915  1,091
10-19  14  191  2,114  1,028
20-29  11  258  4,488  2,215
30-49  7  310  10,243  2,899
50-99  3  220  7,251  2,094
IOD-199  2




Total  73  10,888  728,217  185,319
Source: Ohta City Office, Intermal  Document
50TABLE  11-4
STRUCTURE  OF SILVERWARE  AND  HOUSEWARE  NDUSTRIES
IN TSUBAME:  1991
Silverware  I  Houseware  J Polishing
|  FimSizoyees  Paxexts  |Subcontract°s  Parets  |Subcontractors  Subcontors
Total  148  182  127  265  1,014
1-3  - 24  140  21  188  915
4-9  72  41  49  72  87
10-19  20  - 28  5  11
20-29  20  1  11  - 1
30-49  5  9-
50-99  5  7-
100+  2  2 
Source: Tsubame  City Office(1991). Tsubanie  no Koeyo [Industry in Tsubame], 1991.
Note: * indicates  20 and above.
51TABLE II-S
SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF WEAVING  HOUSES IN FUKUIMISHIKAWA
(Number  of Firms)
Region  -____  21-30  Number of Machines
__________]  1-10  |_11-20  _  _21-30  31-50  [_51-100_[_101-200  |[201+  Total_J
|Fukui  |415  |624-|  201 |  180  81 |  59 |  27  1,587.
Ishikawa  222  9581  3261  155  661  241  18  1,7691
Source: Fukui Sen'i Kyokai, Internal Document.
Ishikawa  Prefecture  Government, Internal Document.
52TABLE i-1
SELECTED  PUBLIC  SUPPORT  RNSTrTUTIONS  IN TSUBAME
Name  Established  Members  Staff  Budget  Activities
__  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  ___  _  __  _  __  _  __  _  _
IndsteAsciations
The Japan Metal  1957  .138  8  T80 million  Marketing and
Flatwame  Assoc.  (20% from city and  R&D
prefecture)
The Japan Metal  1964  79  7  Y100  niillion  Marketing  and
Houseware  Assoc.  (30% from city and  R&D
prefectnue)
The Tsubame  1973  35  5  Y68  million  Marketing
Wholesalers  (112 million from
Cooperative  Assoc.  i  city and prefecture)
Other Institutions
Tsubame Chamber of  1949  3138  23  Y171  million  Provision of info.
Commerce  (160 million from  on almost every-
city and prefecture)  thing iwl.  R&D,
markets, finance
Niigata Prefecral  1974  n.a.  14  - 1.4 billion  R&D
Techical  Center  (prefecture) 
Source: Interviews with officials and official  documents  of respective  institutions.
53TABLE  m-2
-GOVERNMENT  POLICES APPLIED  TO TE
SILVERWARE  INDUSTRY  IN TSUBAME
1960  Small  and Medium  Enterprise  Sector  Specific  Promotion  Temporary  Measures
Law. The silverware  industry  in Tsubame  was designated  as one of sixteen
industries  covered  by this law. Accordingly,  the industry  was given  guidance
l_________  directly  by the central  government  and  by the  SME  council.
|-  1963  Small  and Medium  Enterprise  Moderization  Promotion  Law. The silverware
industry  was designated  as an industry  to be modernized.  Under  the law 5-year
plan.  was formulated  and carried  out mainly  concerning  desired  level  of output  and
reduction  in wage  rate. The law  was revised  and extended  in 1969  and 1974.
1971  Special  measures  to deal  with  the "dollar  shock"  (devaluation  of US dollar)  were
applied  to SMEs.
1977  Special  loan  program  was implemented  to deal  with the problems  caused  by
fluctuation  of the yen value  implemented.  Small  and Medium  Enterprise
Temporary  Measures  Law  Concerning  the Yen  Appreciation  was enacted  to
provide  assistance  to SMEs  suffering  from  the problems  caused  by yen
.________  lappreciation.
1979  Temporary  Measures  Law for Small  and  Medium  Enteprises  -in  Local  Production
Network. Silverware  industry  and metal  houseware  industry  in Tsubame  were
designated  under  the law for industry  promotion.  Under  the law  a promotion  plan
was formulated  by the Japan  Metal  Flatware  Industry  Association.
1986  Temporary  Measures  Law for Small  and Medium  Enterprises  in Specified  Areas.
Tsubame  was selected  as one of 51 areas  and 216 cities,  towns  and villages
l_________  designated  to receive  help  with  promotion.
Source: Constructed  from information  obtained  from  government  documents.
54TABLE m1-3
A BRIEF HISTORY OF TEXTELE  INDUSTRY
POLICY IN FUKUI  PREFECTURE
1902  Fuklo Technical  Support Center was established.
1956-59  Government  purchased  excess capacity  (13,752 machines).
1963  Fukui Technical  Support Center restructured  as Fukui Textile Technical
Supfiort  Center.
1967  First structural  reform project (until 1974) (total budget  Y149,634  milion).
The main purpose of this project was to replace old machines with new
ones.
1970-71  Emergent  loan by the prefecture government  (979 cases, 12,866 million) to
deal with the demand reduction due to Japan-US  texdle treaty.  (The
.______  national  government  provided special  loans in the same period.)
1971-72  Government  purchased  old machines  from weaving houses to assist in  their
-";:tBucturing.-
1974  Second structural reform project (13,175 million)  to strengthen  software
.. ________  technology.
1977-83  Coordinated  scrappig  of machines  (10,596 machines;  114895 million).
1979  Third stuctural reform project (Y9,349  million).
1984-89  Fourth structural reform project (13,593 million).
1985-87  Coordinated  scrapping  of machines (15,559 machines).
1989  Fifth structl  reform project.
1991  Special  loan program of the local goverment  ('1,200 milion).
Source: Constructed  from information  obtained  from government  document.
55TABLE  m-4
CHARACTERISTICS  OF THE  SAMPLE  FIRMS  IN TSUBAME
|  ________  __________  Firm Size  __  __  _
E<10  10<E<30  [ 30<E<8D  80<E  Total
Numberof firms  13  11  10  6  40
TyDe  of ODeration:
*Parent  Firms  7  9  10  6  32
Subcontractors  6  2  0  0  8
Year Established:
Before 1950  1 (7.6)  0  (0.0)  1(10.0)  1 (16.7)  3  (7.5)
1950s  4 (30.8)  2 (19.2)  3 (30.0)  4 (66.7)  13 (32.5)
1960s  5 (38.5)  -5 (45.5)  5 (50.0)  1 (16.7)  16 (40.0)
1970s  2 (15.4)  4 (36.4)  1 (10.0)  0  (0.0)  7 (17.5)
1980s  0  (0.0)  0  (0.0)  0  (0.0)  0  (0.0)  0  (0.0)
1990s  1  (7.6)  0  (0.0)  O (0.0)  0  (0.0)  1  (2.5)
Note: E = number  of employees. The numbers  in parentheses  are percentage  shares  of the total number  of firms
in each respective  size category. Subcontractor  in this table indicates  a firm engaged  in subcontacting activities
only, while parent firms are geneally those engaged  m non-subcontring  as well as subcontrang  activities.
Source: Interview  resul.s.
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~TABLE  1-5
DISTRIBUTION  OF SAMPLE  FiRM  IN FUKUI-ISHIKAWA
(By Date of Establishment)
Number  of  Established  Established  T
Employees  before  WWII  after  WWII  Total
lessthan  50  3  11  14
50-100  7  6  13
more  tan100  6  0  6
Total  16  17  33
Source:  Interview  results.
57TABLE  m-6
CHARACTERISTICS  OF SAMPLE  FIM  IN OHTA
Size (number  of workers)
1-9  10-19  20-50  50-100  100-
10  12  6  0  6
Starting Year
-1945  1945-1955  1955-  no answer
I  I  I3  525
Fonmer  employee of Nakajina HIoki  |  6
Former employee  of parts suppliers for  10
Nakajima  Hiroki or Fuji Heavy Industry
Others  14
No answer  4
Source: Interview Results
58TABLE IV-1
SOURCES OF TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION IN TSUBAME
(PMRCENTAGE  SHAM  OF FMS  INDICATING  THE SOURCES
OF TECHNOLOGY  ACQUISIxION)
source  E<10  |  10<E<301  30cEr  80  |  80<E  Total
Own efforts  100  100  88  100  97
Reverse engineering  10  36  63  50  37
Joint development  30  45  0  67  34
Patent;  0  45  25  50  29
Technology tie  20  27  25  50  29
Number of respondents  10  11  8  6  35
Source: Interview results.
Note:  E  number of employees
59TABLE  IV-2
USEFULNESS  OF TECHNOLOGY  SUPPORT  SYSTEMS  mI TSUBAME
Recii  . Least ->  Most Useful IRespo-  - Average
dents  1Score
Parent  firms  19/36  5  0  1  0  13  3.8
Public  technology  center  18/36  8  0  6  1  3  2.5
Firms in same  business  13/36  4  0  6  0  3  2.8
Equipment  suppliers  13/35  -4  0  3  1  5  3.2
Industry  association  13/35  7  0  4  1  1  2.2
Technical  literature  8136  3  2  2  0  1  2.3
Chamber  of Conmerce  7136  6  0  1  0  0  1.3
Buyers  o136  5  0  0  0  1  1.7
Private  consulting  furms  6136  4  0  1  O  1  2.0
University  7/36  6  O  _  °  O
Source: Authors' tabulation  based  on interview  results.
60TABLE  IV-3
USEFlLNESS  OF TECHNOLOGY  SUPPORT  SYSTEMS
FOR  FIRMS  OF DIFFERENT  SIZES  IN TSUBAME
. Least  >Most  Useful  _
Type of Firm/  Recipientsl  /  Average
Number  of Workers  Respondents  1  2  3  4  - Score
Parentfirms  >80  5t6  2  0  0  01  3  3.4
30-80  5tB  0  0  0  0  5  5.0
10-29  3/11  1  0  0  0  2  3.7
< 10  6/11  2  0  1  0  3  3.3
Public  >80  416  2  0  0  1  1  2.8
Technology  30-80  4/8  2  00  0  2  3.0
Center  10-29  7/11  2  0  5  0  0  2.4
< 10  3/11  2  0  1  0  0  1.7
Firms in Same  >80  3/6  2  0  0  0  1  2.3
Business  30-80  1/8  0  0  1  0  0  3.0
10-29  4/11  1  0  3  0  0  2.5
<10  5/11  1  0  2  0  2  3.4
Equipment  >80  3/6  2  0  0  1  0  2.0
Suppliers  30-80  218  0  0  0  0  1  4.0
10-29  4/11  1  0  2  0  1  3.0
< 10  4/11  1  0  0  0  3  4.0
Industry  >80  416  3  0  1  0  0  1.5
Association/  30-80  1/8  0  0  0  0  1  5.0
Chamber  of  10-29  7/11  3  0  3  1  0  2.3
Commerce  <10  1111  - 1  0  0  0  0  1.0
Source: Authors'  tabulation  based  on interview  results.
61TABLE IV-4
USEFULNESS  OF TECHNOLOGY SUPPORT SYSTEMS
IN FUKUI-ISEIEKAWA
Recipients/  Least  Most Useful  I
Respon-  Average K  dents  L  2  3  4  5  Score
Parent  firmns  27/30  0  3  4  2  is  4.3
Equipment  suppliers  20/30  0  6  3  1  10  3.8
Public  technology  center  14/29  4  2  1  4  3  3.0
Finns in same  business  4/30  1-  1  1  0  1  2.8
Technical  literature  3/29  0  0  1  0  1  4.0
Industry  association  3/30  0  1  0  1  1  3.7
Seminars  3/30  0  1  1  0  1  3.3
University  3/30  1  0  1  0  1  3.0
Buyers  2130  0  1  1  0  0  2.5
Private  consulting  finns  2130  0  0  1  0  1  4.0
Chamber  of Commerce  0130  0  0O  0  01  0.0
Source: Authors'  tabulation  based  on interview  results.
62TABLE  IV-5
USEFULNESS  OF TECHNOLOGY  SUPPORT  SYSTEMS
FOR TYPES  OF FIRMS  IN FUKUI-ISHIKAWA
IRecipients  Least  ->  Most  Uscfu  Average
Type  of Firm/Workers  Respondents  Score
Paret firns  E>100  57n  0  2  O  2  2  4.4
-50-100  10/II  0  1  3  0  6  4.1
20-49  6/6  0  1  1  0  4  4.2
< 19  6/6  0  0  0  0  6  5.0
Equipment  E> 100  4/7  0  3  1  0  0  2.3
Suppliers  50-100  7/11  0  2  0  0  5  4.1
2049  5/6  0  0  2  0  3  4.2
< 19  4/6  0  1  0  1  2  4.0
Public  E>100  5/7  1  1  0  2  1  3.2
Technology  50-100  5/11  1  1  1  1  1  3.0
Center  20-49  4/6  2  0  0  1  1  2.8
< 19  0/5  0  0  0  0  0  0.0
Source: Authors'  tabulation  based  on interview  results.
Note: E  number  of employees
63TABLE IV-6
SOURCES  OF  )IDEAS  FOR  NEW PRODUCTS  AND
NEW MANUFACTURING  PROCESSES  IN OHTA
Recipients  Respondents
Size  of Firm  Own Efforts  Parent  Fimis  Others
50<E  516  2/5  015
20< E <49  7/7  4/7  3/7 (technical  center,  equipment  supplier)
10<E<  19  8/10  6/9  2/8 (exhibition,  trading  company)
E< 10  919  4/14  5/14 (technical  center,  exhibition)
Source:  Interview  results
Note: E =  number  of employees
64TABLE IV-7
USEFUlNESS OF TECHNOLOGY  SUPPORT
SYSTEMS  IN ORTA  (1)
Recipients/  Least  >Most Useful
Respon-  - Average  l
dents  1  2  3  4  5  Score
Parent  firms  24133  4  0  11  4  5  3.3
Equipment  suppliers  21/33  3  0  3  5  10  3.9
Public  technology  center  6133  1  0  1  1  3  3.8
Firms  in same  business  11/33  4  0  2  3  2  2.9
Technical  literature  4/31  3  0  0  1  0  1.8
Industry  association  5/30  1  0  2  1  1  3.2
University  3/32  0  0  0  2  1  4.3
Source: Authors' tabulation  based  on interview  results.
65TABLE  IV
USEFULNESS  OF TECHNOLOGY  SUPPORT
SYSTEMS  IN OHTA (UI)
Recipients  Least -- >Most  Usefl
Type of Firmi  j  Respondents  I  2  3  4  Average
Number  of Workers  1  2  - =  4  5  Score
Parcnt firms  E>50  316  0  0  1  1  1  4.0
20-50  4/7  1  0  3  0  0  2.5
10-19  10/10  2  0  5  2  1  3.0
<10  7/10  1  0  2  1  3  3.7
Equipment  >50  4/6  1  0  0  1  2  3.8
Suppliers  20-50  4/7  1  0  L  0  2  3.5
10-19  6/10  0  0  L  3  2  4.2
>10  7/10  1  0  1  1  4  4.0
Public  >50  1/6  0  0  1  0  0  3.0
Teclnology  20-50  2/7  0  0  0  0  2  5.0
Center  10-19  2110  1  0  0  0  1  3.0
__________  cO<10  1/10  0  0  0  1  0  3.0
Source:  Authors' tabulation based on interview  results.
Note: E  number of employees
66TABLE V-1
CHANNELS OF DISTRIBUTION OF NEW PRODUCTS IN TSUBAME
|  ChannelI  10  % of Firms Using  Chamel (by firm size)  _  _  |
|  Channel  ~~~E<  10  IO  Ec1330130c  E C801  80<E  Total
Parene  firms  43  33  25  20  31
Local trading house  43  67  50  40  52
Non-local trading house  14  22  50  47  31
Direct marketing  0  33  25  80  31
Number of respondenls  7  9  8  5  29
Note: E =  number of employees
Source:  Authors' calculation  based on interview results.
67TABLE  V-2
USEFULNESS  OF MARKETING  SUPPORT  SYSTEMS  IN TSUBAME
Rocipients  Least  >--  Most Useful
Rupon  Averagc
dass  ~1  2  3  .4  5  Scorem
Suportinp, Institutions:- 
City  office  429j  I  O  -2  1  3.0
Industy association  4/30  0  1  1  0  2  3.8
Chamber  of Commerce  4/30  1  1  1  0  0  2.0
Tyve  of Suooort:
Provision  of information  427  0  0  2  0  2  4.0
Sending  buyers  -227  0  0  1  0  1  4.0
Identification  of buyes  3127  0  1  2  0  0  2.3
Scnding  in orders  3/27  2  0  0  0  1  2.3
Organizing  trade  fairs  4/28  3  0  1  0  0  1.5
Exploratorytrips  4/28  0  1  1  0  2  3.8
Source:  Authors' tabulation  based on interview results.
68TABLE V-3
MARKET SUPPORT  IN FUKUI-ISHIKAWA
Recipients  Least -- >Most  Useful
Respon-  :  2  3  Average
dents  4  5  Score
Parent  company  9/33  0  2  0  1  6  4.2
Industry  association  9133  9  0  0  0  0  1.0
Chamber  of Commerce  9133  9  0  0  0  0  1.0
Govenment  9/33  9  0  0  0  0  1.0
Others  5/33  4  0  0  0  1  _1.8
Source:  Interview  results.
69TABLE V-4
MARKET SUPPORT  IN OHTA
Recipientsl  Least  ----- >Most  Usefu ___
Respon-  . Average
dent  I  2  3  _4  5  Score
Parent company  21/34  10  1  1  1  8  2.8
Industry  association/
Chamber of Commerce  21134  19  1  0  0  1  1.2
Goverrment  21134  17  0  0  0  4  1.7
Trading House  21/34  16  3  1  1  0  1.4
Source: Interview results.
70TABLE V-5
USEFULNESS  OF MARKET  SUPPORT SYSTEMS
FOR FIRMS OF DIF`ERENT  SIZES IN OHTA
Recipients/  |  Least  -- >Most  Useful
Type of Firmi/  Respon-  I  Average
|  Number  of Workers  dents  I  2  3  4  15  Score
Parentfirms  >50  4/6  3  0  0  0  1  2.0
20-50  6/6  4  1-  0  0  1  1.8
10-19  6/12  2  0  0  1  3  3.5
< 10  5/10  1  0  1  0  3  3.8
Industry  >50  4/6  4  0  0  0  0  1.0
Association  20-50  6/6  5  1  0  0  0  1.2
10-19  6/12  6  0  0  0  0  1.0
< 10  5/10  4  0  0  0  1  1.8
Government  >50  416  4  0  0  0  0  1.0
20-50  616  5  0  0  0  1  1.7
10-19  6/12  5  0  0  0  1  1.7
< 10  5/10  3  0  0  0  2  2.6
Trading  House  >50  416  2  1  1  0  0  1.8
20-50  616  6  0  0  0  0  1.0
10-19  6/12  5  1  0  0  0  1.2
<10  5/10  3  1  0  1  0  1.8
Source: Authors' tabulation  based  on interview  results.
Note: E =  number  of employees
71TABLE VI-1
OUTSTANDING  LENDING  BALANCES  TO SMEs
(100  Million Yen: %)
1960  11970  1980  1985
Value  Share  -Value  Share  Value  |  Share  Value  Share
Private  banks  A  22,900  55.7  103,121  45.0  541,138  50.3  961,806  55.7
B  1,331  25.3  19,683  34.8  113,733  45.7  186,667  50.3
Private  SME  finance  A  14,468  35.1  101,354  44.2  405,178  37.7  582,006  33.7
institutions  B  2,241  42.7  23,334  41.2  83,700  33.6  121,573  32.7
Public  SME  finance  A  3,808  9.2  24,608  10.7  129,329  12.0  184,183  10.7
institutions  B  1,680  32.0  13,562  24.0  51,659  20.7  63,196  17.5
Total  lending  to SMEs  A  41,268  100.0  229,085  100.0  1,075,645  100.0  1,727,994  100.0
B  _  5,253  100.0  56,580  100.0  249,092  100.0  371,436 _  100.0
Share  of lending  to SMEs  A  41.2  43.4  56.7  58.5
in overall  lending  (%)  B  21.8  37.2  50.9  54.5
Source:  Japan's  Economic  Development  and  Small  and  Medium  Enterprises,  Doyukan,  1987,  Table  3-4.
Chushokigyo  Kinvu  Koko 30 Nenshi [30 Year History  of the Small Business  Corporation,  19841,  Chushokigyo  Kinyu  Koko, and
Chushokiuyo  Hakusho  [White  Paper  on Small  and  Medium  Enterprises],  1991  Volume,  Chushokigyo  Cho.
Note:  A and B respectively  indicate  overall  lending  and lending  for fixed  investment  only,  at the end  of March  for respective  years.
72TABLE VI-2
PUBLIC CREDIT SUPPLEMENTATION  SYSTEM
(Billion  Yen)
. 1950  1960  119701  1980  1984  ]
The Credit Guarantee
Association:
Value  of loans  guaranteed  Annual  25  177  1,364  5,203  5,712
Cumulative  - 898  8,287  42,427  64,101
Balance  of outstanding  11  124  1,314  7,129  8,551
loans  guaranteed  l
The Small Business  Credit
Insurance  Corporation:
Value  of loans  insured  Anual  57  142  1,274.  5,118  5,585
Cumuilative  241  474  7,344  40,677  61,847
Balance  of outstanding  3  7  64  233  304
loans  to The Credit
Guarantee  Association
Source:  Japan's Economic Development  and Small and Medium Enter7rises, Doyukan, 1987,
Tables  3-12.
Note: The first year that The  values are given  for the Small  Business  Credit Insurance  Corporation  is
1958  instead  of 1950.
73TABLE VI-3
USErULNESS  OF FINANCIAL  SUPPORT  SYSTEMS  IN TSUBAME
[  Recipicatsl  Lent  ----- >Most  Useful
R  Hl-  I  AveI
dents  |1  2  3  4  5  .sorwe-|
Own fund  25534  0  0  5  0  20  4.6
Loans from private sources:
Commercial banks  26/34  0  0  11  1  14  4.1
Credit associations  9/34  1  0  2  1  5  4.0
Loansfrom  governments:
Cental  govemment  9/34  0  0  6  0  3  3.7
Prefectural governmcnt  15/34  1  0  8  1  5  3.6
City government  5/34  0  0  3  1  1  3.9
Loans from public financial
institutions:
Small Business  FinanceCorp.  14/34  0  0  8  2  7  4.4
People's Finance Corp.  6/34  0  0  4  1  9  3.7
Shoko Chukin Bank  2134  0  0  4  0  2  3.5
Source:  Authors' tabulation  based on interview  results.
74TABLE  VI-4
USEFULNESS  OF FINANCIAL  SUPPORT  SYSTEMS  IN FUKUTISHIKAWA  (1)
Recipients!  /  Least  >  Most Useful
Respon-  F-  - f-Averge
- - |  dents  |  1  |  2  3  |4  - 5  LSr
Own fund  31/33  6  5  13  2  5  2.8
Loans  from private  sources:
Commercial  banks - 31/33  8  2  1  2  18  3.6
Credit  associations  28/33  24  2  0  1  L  1.3
Loans  from goverments:
Central  government  28/33  13  1  1  0  13  3.0
Prcfectaul government  30/33  6  2  4  5  13  3.6
City  govement  27/33  26  0  0  1  0  1.1
Loans  from public  financial
instituions:
Small  Business  Finance  Corp.  30/33  12  3  1  2  12  3.0
People's  Finance  Corp.  30533  24  2  1  0  3  1.5
Shoko  Chulin Bank  29133  11  3  1  4  10  3.0
Source:  Interview  results.
75TABLE  VI-5
USEFULNESS  OF FINANCIL  SUPPORT  SYSTEMS  IN FUKU4-ISHA  (
Firm Size  Recipients/  Least --- >Most Useful  |
_Respon-  Z  |  Average
___________  ______  ~dents  2345score
Ownfund  E>100  5/6  0  2  3  0  0  2.6
50-100  13/13  3  1  6  1  2  2.8
20-49  6n  I  1  2  0  2  3.2
<20  7n  2  1  2  1  1  2.7
Loans from private
sources: commercial  > 100  516  1  0  0  0  4  4.2
banks  50-100  13113  1  1  0  1  10  4.4
20-49  6/7  3  1  0  0  2  2.5
<20  7/7  3  0  1  1  2  2.9
Credit associations
> 100  5/6  4  1  0  0  0  1.2
50-100  12/13  10  1  0  1  0  1.3
20-49  6/7  6  0  0  0  0  1.0
<20  5/7  4  0  0  0  1  1.8
Loans from
govemnments:  Central  > 100  5/6  3  0  0  0  2  2.6
govemment  50-100  12/13  7  0  0  0  5  2.7
20-49  5/7  1  0  0  0  4  4.2
<20  6/7  2  1  1  1  2  2.8
Prefectural
govenment  > 100  5/6  1  I  0  1  2  3.4
50-100  12113  3  1  3  0  5  3.3
20-49  6/7  2  0  0  1  3  3.5
<20  7/7  0  0  1  3  3  4.3
City government
>100  516  5  0  0  0  0  1.0
50-100  11/13  11  0  0  0  0  1.0
20-49  6/7  5  0  0  1  0  1.5
<20  5/7  5  0  0  0  0  1.0
Loans from public
financial  institutions:  > 100  5/6  3  1  0  1  0  1.8
Small Business  50-100  13/13  3  1  1  0  8  3.7
Finance Corp.  20-49  6/7  2  0  0  1  3  3.5
<20  6/7  4  1  0  0  1  1.8
People's Finance
Corporations  > 100  516  5  0  0  0  0  1.0
50-100  13/13  10  1  1  0  1  1.5
20-49  6/7  6  0  0  0  0  1.0
<20  6/7  3  1  0  0  2  2.5
Shoko Chulin Bank
> 100  516  1  1  0  1  2  3.4
50-100  12/13  4  1  1  0  6  3.3
20-49  6/7  3  0  0  1  2  2.8
<20  6/7  3  1  0  2  0  2.2
Source: Interview results.  76
Note: E = number of employeesTABLE VI-6
CUMULATIVE  1NVESTMENT  (LAST  5 YEARS)
AND  AVERAGE  AMOUNT  OF ANNUAL  SALES  IN OHTA
Investment  Amount  Number of Finns  Average Annual Sales  Avere  Number of
I  __-  _  ._._,__'_.._-  Employees
No answer  0
<Y10 million  6  197 million  13
|10  - 30 million  7 _120  million  12
|30  - Y60  million  6  -64  million  8
|60  - YlOO  million  6  1318 million  14
>1Y100  million  9  19,967 million  238
Source: Interview results.
77TABLE  XVI-7
USEFULNESS  OF FNANCIAL SUPPORT  SYSTEMS  IN OHTA
RecipientslR  Least ---- >Most  Useful
capon-dents  - --  - - Average
1  2  3  4  5  Score
.~~~  ~  -
Own fund  3G0/34  9  3  4  0  14  3.2
Loans from private sources:
Commercial banks  27/34  7  0  2  2  16  3.7
Credit associations  21134  to1  0  1  2  8  2.9
Loans from gove41ments:  |  . 0
Central government  19/34  15  O  1  3  1.7
Prefectural government  25/34  7  2  2  0  14  3.5
City government  23/34  10  0  1  0  12  3.2
Loans from public financial
institutions:
Small Business Finance Corp.  23/34  13  0  2  1  7  2.5
People's Finance Corp.  24/34  15  0  2  0  7  2.3
Shoko Chukin Bankl  22134  17  0  1  1  3  1.8
Source: lterview  result.
78TABLE V1-S
FINANCIAL  SUPPORT  IN OBTA
ReciplentsRe  Least ------ > Most  Useful
spondents  1  Average
1  2  -3_4  5  Score
Own_  fud  E>50  616  0  1  2  0  3  3.8
20-50  6/6  2  0  1  0  3  3.3
10.19  9112  5  1  0  0  3  2.4
<10  9/10  2  1  1  0  5  3.6
Loans  from private
sources:  >50  6/6  0  0  0  0  6  5.0
Commercial  20-50  516  2  0  1  1  1  2.8
bamns  - 10-19  8/12  3  0  0  1  4  3.4
<10  8110  2  0  1  0  5  3.8
Credit associations  >50  4/6  2  0  0  0  2  3.0
20-50  4/6  3  0  0  1  0  1.8
10-19  6/12  3  0  0  1  2  2.8
<10  7/10  2  0  1  0  4  3.6
Loans from
governments:  >50  5/6  4  0  0  0  1  1.8
Cetral  govemment  20-50  5/6  3  0  1  0  1  2.2
10-19  4/12  4  0  0  0  0  1.0
<10  5/10  4  0  0  0  1  1.8
Prefccmm
goverment  >50  6/6  3  2  0  0  1  2.0
20-50  4/6  0  0  1  0  3  4.5
10-19  b/12  1  0  1  0  6  4.3
<10  7/10  3  0  0  0  4  3.3
City gove.  .ent
>50  616  5  0  0  0  1  1.7
20-50  3/6  1  0  1  0  1  3.0
10-19  8/12  3  0  0  0  5  3.5
<10  6/10  1  0  0  0  5  4.3
Public  loans from:
Smal Business  >50  6/6  3  0  0  0  3  3.0
Finance  Corp.  20-50  5/6  2  0  0  1  2  3.2
10-19  6/12  3  0  2  0  1  2.3
<10  6/10  5  0  0  0  1  1.7
People's Finance
Corp..
>50  6/6  6  0  0  0  0  1.0
20-50  5/6  4  0  1  0  0  1.4
10-19  6/12  2  0  1  0  3  3.3
<10  7/10  3  0  0  0  4  3.3
Shoko  Caukin  Bank
>50  5r6  1  0  1  0  3  3.8
20-50  5/6  4  0  0  1  0  1.6
10-19  5/12  5  0  0  0-  0  1.0
< 10  7/10  7  D  0  0  0  1.0
Souce: Interview  resuts.
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Note: E =  number  of employcesFigure It- 1.  PRODUCTION  SYSTEM  OF SrVERWARE  AND HOUSEWARES  INDUSTRIES  IN TSUBAME
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80Figure 11-2 THE FLOW  OF YARNS  AND TEXTIES  AMONG  FIRMS IN FUKUI-ISHIKAWA
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